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ABSTRACT 
From the Second World War to the present, ethnic civil wars have continued to be a 
frequent and widespread phenomenon. Most of the existing literature on civil wars in 
general and ethnic conflict in particular is concerned with explaining onset of conflict, 
leaving the question of different intensity of violence under-researched. This thesis 
attempts to fill this gap by examining the link between structural conditions of ethnic 
conflicts and their violent outcomes. Specifically, it is argued that settlement patterns of 
conflicting ethnic groups may have explanatory power regarding different intensity of 
violence in conflict. Once distinct ethnic groups engage in conflict, their patterns of 
settlement present a strategic challenge for the warring parties. First, the more intermixed 
are the opponents’ population bases, the harder it becomes to protect own population and 
the easier target opponent’s population becomes. Second, interspersed ethnic groups are 
likely to produce abundance of small, disconnected and loosely organized militant units, 
which are virtually impossible to effectively manage and command, and subsequently 
control damage. The proposed hypotheses are tested using geospatial data on ethnic 
settlement patterns and through case studies. The evidence found during empirical 
analysis confirms that ethnic settlements have explanatory power regarding different 
intensity of inter-ethnic violence.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
From the Second World War to the present, ethnic civil wars have continued to be 
a frequent and widespread phenomenon. In his research, Fearon finds that among 128 
civil wars that have occurred since 1945, 70 (55%) were carried out “by groups organized 
along ethnic lines” and 21 (17%) more cases were mixed or ambiguous.1 According to 
Toft, “ethnic conflicts are the most prevalent form of armed conflict and are unlikely to 
abate in the short or long term. The number and intensity of ethnic conflicts across the 
globe directly and indirectly threaten the lives of millions.”2 In many cases, ethnic civil 
wars have been important forces of state-building, as societies united by powerful ethnic 
and national identities exercised their right to self-determination; but more often than not 
these conflicts have been major sources of local, regional and international instability.  
Although war and conflict are among the most important research subjects for the 
political scientist, few try to explain the degrees of violence observed in civil conflicts. It 
is established that, due to certain factors, some countries may be more likely to 
experience civil wars. But conflict may be relatively minor in terms of inflicted damage, 
or, conversely, highly lethal. For example, Sambanis calculates that in 146 civil wars that 
occurred between 1945 and 1999, the mean number of estimated deaths was 143,883 and 
the median was 19,000, while in 11 conflicts the number of killed was estimated at fewer 
than 1,500.3 However, most of the existing literature on civil wars and ethnic conflicts is 




                                                 
1 James D. Fearon, "Why do some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?" Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 288. 
2 Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of 
Territory (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003), 3. 
3 Nicholas Sambanis, "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 814–858. As cited in Stathis N. Kalyvas, 
The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 54, note 4.  
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intensities of violence under-researched. As Lacina rightly argues, “the burgeoning 
literature on civil conflicts seldom considers why some civil wars are so much deadlier 
than others.”4  
This deficiency in the understanding of ethnic conflict may have serious 
implications for state policies and joint international efforts. The failure to adequately 
address the issues of potentially intense inter-ethnic violence may be extremely grave, as 
the conflicts in Rwanda, Sudan or former Yugoslavia demonstrate. Moreover, the issue of 
limited resources that the international community is able to allocate towards resolving 
security problems demands prioritization of efforts. Obviously, lethal conflicts that are 
potentially more dangerous deserve greater and earlier attention of peacekeeping efforts 
and peace-reestablishing missions. Therefore, there is a need to search for theoretically 
sound and empirically grounded explanations that would give policymakers some insight 
as to which wars are potentially more deadly, and how decision-makers can influence the 
situation to prevent lethal escalation. 
This thesis will attempt to fill an existing gap by examining the link between 
structural conditions of ethnic conflicts and their violent outcomes. Why so some inter-
ethnic conflicts result in significantly more violence than others? What are the factors 
that increase or decrease likely intensity of ethnic conflict? These highly important 
questions may have many answers, since ethnic conflict is by no means a simple 
phenomenon. In each case, different factors exist, including those endogenous to the 
conflict, which may explain the high or low levels of observed violence. Therefore, this 
thesis will not try to develop a comprehensive theory of ethnic war. Rather, it will 
contribute to the understanding of ethnic civil conflicts by analyzing the relationship 
between important structural factors—settlement patterns—and the varying intensities of 
violence in ethnic conflicts in an attempt to determine how the different settlement 
patterns of ethnic groups in conflicts may be a direct cause in the intensity of committed 
violence. Specifically, it is argued that once distinct ethnic groups engage in conflict, 
their patterns of settlement present a strategic challenge for the warring parties. The more 
                                                 
4 Bethany Lacina, "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 
2 (2006), 276.   
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ethnically intermixed the opponents are, the easier their population bases become targets. 
The abundance of small, poorly protected enclaves, easily attacked by independent or 
loosely controlled armed groups, makes it impossible to effectively control damage.  
This hypothesis will be evaluated using several available datasets on civil wars 
from 1946 to 2008, and geo-coded data on ethnic settlement patterns. The primary source 
of information on the severity of the conflicts is the International Peace Research Institute 
Oslo’s (PRIO) “Battle Deaths Dataset,”5 which includes information on all of the armed 
conflicts that have reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths (both civilian and 
military) in any given year. Therefore, this dataset allows large variance of the dependent 
variable (intensity of conflict) by including minor hostilities as well as major wars. 
The analysis will focus on civil wars where one or more conflicting parties 
mobilized support along ethnic lines. It is concerned only with instances of inter-ethnic 
relations that turned violent. The sample of ethnic groups for analysis will include only 
ethnicities that already participate in conflict due to the fact that this research is not 
interested in comparing instances of conflict with cases of peaceful coexistence. The 
analysis will be based on disaggregation of ethnic conflicts to the level of ethnic groups 
as primary actors. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to increase the understanding of 
ethnic war dynamics, in order to develop effective strategies for reducing intensity and 
avoiding the potential extensive human costs of ethnic wars.  
Chapter II highlights conceptual problems regarding civil wars and other types of 
political violence, as well as discussing ethnicity and ethnic groups in conflict. Chapter 
III offers analysis of the available limited research that has been done thus far on the 
question of intensity of civil wars and ethnic conflicts and it reviews other existing 
approaches to the study of civil conflict in terms of their applicability for future use in 
dealing with the problem of severity and intensity of ethnic wars. Chapter IV of the thesis 
is devoted to outlining a tentative theoretic framework that incorporates the impact of 
settlement patterns on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. Chapter V uses available datasets 
to apply a proposed theoretic framework, and provides discussion of major findings. 
                                                 
5 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of 
Battle Deaths," European Journal of Population 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 145. 
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Chapter VI includes four case studies that compare conflicts with lower intensity 
(Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tracts and Slovenia) to civil wars with a higher intensity of 
fighting (Sri Lankan Tamils and Bosnia). The conclusion offers a summary of major 
findings and their implications for state policies that can resolve ethnic conflicts.  
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II. THE CONCEPT OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 
The abundance of definitions for civil war, ethnic conflict, ethnicity, and other 
concepts relevant to this study requires that a special attempt be made to clarify their 
meanings. Such effort has practical utility, even if it is virtually impossible to find one 
agreed upon definition for any of these terms. The following discussion of definitions and 
conceptual problems will put the subject of this study—intensity of ethnic conflicts—into 
a broader theoretic context. Therefore, this chapter will not focus on resolving existing 
disputes and finding correct conceptual answers. Rather, it will bring to attention existing 
ambiguities and problems, and outline the conceptual basis of further analysis. 
A. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CIVIL WAR 
What is civil war? How is civil war different from other types of organized 
political violence? One of the most widely accepted definitions of civil war is given by 
Small and Singer, who explain it as “armed conflict that involves (a) military action 
internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) 
effective resistance by both sides.”6 
The three identified dimensions—internality, government participation, and 
effective resistance—also guide Sambanis’s operational definition of civil war, which is 
based on 11 precise criteria.7 This criteria includes requirements such as 1) the war must 
occur in the territory of a recognized member of the international system, 2) the conflict 
is between politically and militarily organized parties with publicly stated political 
objectives, where government or its representative is a principal combatant, 3) the main 
insurgent organization generates at least some local support, and 4) a “weaker party is 
able to mount effective resistance.”8 
                                                 
6Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms : International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, 2nd 
ed. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1982), 210.  
7 Nicholas Sambanis, "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004), 829. 
8 Ibid., 829. 
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Kalyvas argues for a broader definition, relaxing the requirement for 
government’s direct participation in the conflict. He describes civil war as an “armed 
combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to 
a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”9 While characteristics of the 
participating actors, as well as reasons why they fight, may vary significantly, civil wars 
are always “related to the effective breakdown of the monopoly of violence by way of 
armed internal challenge.”10 The place of civil war among other types of armed conflict is 
aptly illustrated in Small and Singer:11 
 
Figure 1.   Typology of War (After Small and Singer, 1982. Resort to Arms: 
International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980) 
This typology, however, does not clearly specify the difference between civil war 
and other forms of intrastate-level political and social violence. On this level, the civil 
war is a distinct phenomenon because of its degree of actors’ organization and 
sophistication, effectiveness of violent resistance, and inherent challenge to sovereignty. 
                                                 
9 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 17. 
10 Ibid., 18. 
11 Small and Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, 217. 
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Spontaneous violent protests and riots may have political causes and lead to a significant 
amount of damage, but they do not display a sufficient level of enduring organization. 
Genocides and politicides are often perpetuated by well-organized entities but lack 
effective resistance on behalf of the oppressed. Crime and inter-communal violence may 
involve effective resistance to authority and/or sophisticated social networks, but they 
lack political aims and a challenge to sovereignty. 
In practice, however, it is often difficult to distinguish between different types of 
political violence. Civil wars may include genocidal episodes, or larger cases of genocide 
may contain minor instances of armed opposition. In many cases, complete, accurate and 
unbiased information about conflicts may be missing. The information may come from 
unreliable sources and be open to interpretation, since conflicting actors often describe 
the same events in different lights. As Kalyvas points out, insurgents seeking legitimacy 
portray themselves as revolutionaries, while incumbents tend to label insurgents as 
criminals or bandits: “The spillover effect of this semantic contest has affected research 
on the topic, as definitions of civil war have tended, until recently at least, to hinge on the 
war’s outcome.”12 
Sambanis identifies several other problems in the same vein.13 Civil wars are 
sometimes difficult to distinguish from anti-colonial conflicts, like the ongoing conflict 
between Russia and Chechens. In the situations of state collapse (e.g., Somalia since the 
1990s), there is almost no such thing as a “sovereign government.” Also, it is difficult to 
define the level of actors’ organization sufficient for classification of the conflict as civil 
war. In addition, the intermittent and shifting character of hostilities makes it difficult to 
define the end of a war and the beginning of a new war, or single out episodes that belong 
to different types of political violence. Therefore, any reliable collection of information 
on civil wars will inevitably face the necessity for ad hoc decisions regarding coding 
ambiguous cases.  
                                                 
12 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 17. 
13 Sambanis, What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition, 816. 
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The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) / Peace Research Institute of Oslo 
(PRIO) dataset, the major source of conflict intensity data used in this research, employs 
the terms “intrastate armed conflict” and “intrastate conflict with foreign involvement” 
synonymously to civil war. An armed conflict is:  
A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one 
calendar year. […] “Armed conflict” is also referred to as “state-based 
conflict,” as opposed to “non-state conflict,” in which none of the warring 
parties is a government.14  
To ensure consistency, this research will rely on the operational definition of intrastate 
armed conflict used by the UCDP. The terms “armed conflict” and “civil war” are used 
interchangeably and have the same meaning, unless specified otherwise.  
In this thesis, the major emphasis is put on the civil war as an environment. War is 
an outcome produced by participating actors and continuously maintained by actors’ 
inputs. From this perspective, civil war is the result of decisions and actions of its 
participants. But it also becomes an environment, or a set of conditions, under which 
actors operate. From this second perspective, civil war affects the calculations, decisions, 
and actions of the actors, as well as the outcomes of these actions. For example, during 
the civil conflicts in the former country of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, ethnic-based militias 
were engaged in killing and looting, something unthought-of in peaceful times preceding 
the wars. As Kalyvas argues, “a civil war is likely to open a Pandora’s box of violence.”15 
The notion of violence in civil war is by no means straightforward. In the broadest 
sense, violence may be any action or inaction that is considered unjust. In civil war, 
violence is both its attribute and result. As Small and Singer argue, it is impossible to 
conceive of war without violence. They consider the “violent taking of human life the 
primary and dominant characteristic of war.”16 In its physical expression during a civil 
 
                                                 
14 UCDP/PRIO dataset, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ (accessed October 22, 2010). 
15 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 20. 
16 Small and Singer, Resort to Arms : International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, 206.  
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war, violence includes killing or maiming people, damaging property, destroying 
infrastructures and the economy, and forcing populations to flee or take refuge to evade 
being killed or hurt. 
Therefore, the most commonly used measure of violent impacts resulting from 
conflicts includes numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, civilian 
casualties, and battle deaths.17 The full-fledged test of the intensity of a civil war would 
have to include these three indicators, as well as additional data on economic, political, 
and social costs of the war.  
This research, however, will be limited only to the numbers of battle related 
deaths in measuring conflict severity, despite the availability of some data on refugee 
flows and killed civilians. Available figures on refugees and internally displaced persons 
include data on a limited number of years (1980–1999),18 which would significantly 
reduce the number of observations. Since numbers of civilians killed, apart from data on 
battle related deaths, include victims of genocides, politicides and other types of violence 
beyond the scope of this research, they cannot be directly included in the primary 
analysis of the impact of civil war. Therefore, the overall amount of violence observed in 
many conflicts may be actually greater than the figures reflected in the UCDP data. 
Perhaps, more comprehensive analysis will be possible when more complete data on 
other indicators becomes available.  
It remains problematic to empirically separate the three forms of violence 
produced by civil war—battle deaths, civilian casualties, and refugee flows. Obviously, if 
all civilians were willing and able to flee the conflict zone, the amount of battle deaths 
and civilian casualties would be significantly lower or absent. At the same time, it is the 
greater amount of violence against peaceful populations that creates incentives to flee the 
 
 
                                                 
17 E. Melander, M. Öberg and J. Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians 
Killed and Forced Migration before and After the End of the Cold War," European Journal of International 
Relations 15, no. 3 (Sep, 2009), 515–516. 
18 Ibid., 516. 
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conflict area, while lower casualty figures should be, in principle, associated with smaller 
refugee flows. Arguably, the relationship between the different types of violence in civil 
war deserves a separate and more substantial analysis.  
The definition of battle-related deaths employed here is also adopted from UCDP:  
Counted as battle-related deaths is armed conflict behaviour between 
warring parties in a conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state. In state-
based conflicts the violence must be directly related to the incompatibility, 
i.e., carried out with the purpose of realizing the goal of the 
incompatibility and result in deaths. […] Typically, battle-related deaths 
occur in what can be described as "normal" warfare involving the armed 
forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, 
guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks / ambushes) and all kinds of 
bombardments of military units, cities and villages etc. The targets are 
usually the military itself and its installations, or state institutions and state 
representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form 
of civilians killed in crossfire, indiscriminate bombings etc. All deaths—
military as well as civilian—incurred in such situations, are counted as 
battle-related deaths.19 
What is conflict intensity and how can it be measured? Sislin and Pearson define intensity 
of conflict as the number of casualties divided over time.20 Usually, annual measures are 
employed, but it is also plausible to use daily and monthly average figures derived from 
the entire number of battle-related deaths caused by conflict from its onset to its end. It is 
also feasible to divide overall losses of human lives by population figures or other 
demographic indicators. The analysis in this thesis is based on the aggregated battle 
deaths data per conflict divided by the overall duration of the war (in days). The measure 
of the intensity of fighting thus reflects the average daily casualty count for each conflict.  
B. ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT 
Since the subject of this research concerns only “ethnic” civil wars, the 
relationship between ethnicity, nationalism and conflict deserves separate attention. 
There are different approaches and opinions as to the exact meaning of ethnicity, but 
                                                 
19 UCDP/PRIO dataset. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ (accessed October 22, 2010). 
20 John Sislin and Frederic S. Pearson, Arms and Ethnic Conflict. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publ., 2001): 93. 
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most tend to agree that “ethnicity has something to do with the classification of people 
and group relationships.”21 Ethnicity is the “consciousness of difference and the 
subjective salience of that difference.”22 Esman defines ethnic identity as “the set of 
meanings that individuals impute to their membership in an ethnic community, including 
those attributes that bind them to that collectivity and that distinguish it from others in 
their relevant environment.”23  
According to Horowitz, “Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, 
whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of 
common origin, or some combination thereof.”24 Weber similarly emphasizes that ethnic 
groups are  
Those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common 
descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or 
because of memories of colonization and migration. This belief must be 
important for the propagation of group formation; it does not matter 
whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.25  
Three major approaches—primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist—subsume 
existing explanations of the formation of ethnic identity.26 While primordialism views 
ethnicity as a fixed category that emerges on top of objective differences between 
communities and kinship ties within communities, instrumentalism emphasizes the role 
of leaders in creating ethnicity. Ethnic identity then becomes an effective tool of 
                                                 
21 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism : Anthropological Perspectives (London ; 
Boulder, Colo: Pluto Press, 1993), 4. 
22  Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict : An Anthropological Perspective on 
International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 9. 
23 Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 27. 
24 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 17. 
25 Max Weber, Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Uniform Title: Wirtschaft 
Und Gesellschaft. English. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 
1968), 389. 
26 For comparative discussion of these approaches, see Ray Taras and Rajat Ganguly, Understanding 
Ethnic Conflict : The International Dimension, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2002); similar classification 
with alternative names for approaches can be found in Thomas S. Szayna, Identifying Potential Ethnic 
Conflict : Application of a Process Model (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000), 17. An earlier but more extensive 
critique of existing theories can be found in Richard H. Thompson, Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical 
Appraisal (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 196. 
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mobilizing support and ensuring group cohesion, and subsequently solidifying the 
leader’s position in the community. This thesis converges with the third approach that 
views ethnicity as a socially constructed category: the creation of ethnicity is not entirely 
guided by deliberate premeditated actions of elites in anticipation of personal benefits; 
the meaning of ethnic identity is invented and negotiated as a result of broader 
participation of community in interactive processes. Constructivism claims that “ethnicity 
is the product of a social process rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather 
than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through 
birth.”27  
Ethnicity is a cognitive phenomenon, since it is what people think of themselves 
and others. Ethnicity is collective, since it is meaningful only in connection with the 
group of people that share it and see themselves as distinct from others. Ethnicity is 
heterogeneous, because its “salience and depth […] will vary across groups and 
individuals.”28 Ethnicity is relative, because it did not exist before the emergence of 
modern nations.29 As Szayna notes, “ethnicity as a phenomenon becomes real only 
because of the subjective constructions of individuals under certain circumstances and 
not because it exists a priori as some intrinsically permanent solidarity binding a set of 
individuals across time and space.”30 Benedict Anderson’s argument regarding 
nationalism as the act of inventing nations and that those nations are just imagined 
communities31 almost equally applies to ethnic identity as one of the major sources of 
national identity. Just like nations, ethnic groups imagine themselves to be free, to be a 
 
 
                                                 
27 Andreas Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process 
Theory," The American Journal of Sociology 113, no. 4 (2008), 971. 
28 Bruce Gilley, "Review: Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 
(2004), 1158. 
29 William Petersen, Ethnicity Counts (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 
32. 
30 Szayna, Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict : Application of a Process Model, 26. 
31 Benedict Anderson, "Imagined Communities," in Nations and Nationalism : A Reader, eds. Philip 
Spencer and Howard Wollman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 49. 
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community and to have boundaries. Yinger’s typology (Table 1) illustrates how a 
different understanding of ethnic belonging by the group themselves and by outsiders 
shapes ethnic identities. 32 
Table 1.   Varieties of Ethnic Identity (From Yinger, 1994. Ethnicity: Source of Strength? 
Source of Conflict?) 
 I. Are they perceived by others as ethnically distinct? 
 Yes No 
 II. Do individuals perceive themselves 
as ethnically distinct? 
Do individuals perceive themselves 
as ethnically distinct? 
III. Do they 
participate 
in shared 
activities? Yes No Yes No 
Yes 1. Full 2. Unrecognized 3. Private 4. Hidden 
No 5. Symbolic 6. Stereotyped 7. Imagined 8. Nonethnic 
 
Roosens, among others, points also to the flexibility of ethnic identification: 
“virtually anything that has not already been explicitly or publicly affirmed by members 
of other ethnic groups as ethnic emblems can, in principle, become an emblem of 
ethnicity for other groups.”33 This flexibility allows for the negotiation and re-negotiation 
of the exact meaning of people’s identity,34 in which outsiders may play as important of a 
role as insiders. For example, the 1903 census organized by the Ottoman Empire in 
today’s Macedonia led to competition between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia for forceful 
identification of the local population as belonging to corresponding ethnicities, often 
                                                 
32 J. Milton Yinger, Ethnicity : Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), 4. 
33 Eugeen Roosens, Creating Ethnicity : The Process of Ethnogenesis (Newbury Park, Calif: Sage 
Publications, 1989), 18. 
34 Wimmer, The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory, 970–
1022. 
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contrary to the population’s own desires.35 Wimmer identifies four dimensions along 
which ethnic identities display variance: political salience of boundaries, social closure 
and “groupness,” cultural differentiation, and degree of stability over time.36  
The entrance of ethnic identity into the political realm marks its transition to 
ethno-nationalism.37 Although national idea may also be based on a platform other than 
ethnicity (i.e.,, religious, civic, or multinational), ethno-nationalism has arguably become 
one of the major forces of state formation in modern history. Ethnic groups become 
ethnopolitical groups, meaning that their identity has “political consequences, resulting 
either in differential treatment of group members or in a political action on behalf of 
group interests.”38 As Wimmer, Cederman and Min emphasized,  
Ethnicity matters because the nation-state itself relies on ethnonational 
principles of political legitimacy: the state is ruled in the name of an 
ethnically defined people and rulers should therefore care for “their own 
people.” As a result, ethnicity and nationhood have much greater political 
significance in nation-states than they do in other types of polities such as 
empires or city-states.39 
This transition to ethno-nationalism is often accompanied with conflict and violence. The 
flexible and shifting character of ethnicity makes it vulnerable to political manipulations, 
as “political leaders can create stereotypes that give almost religious exaltedness to ethnic 
identity and, via stereotypes, lead to economic and cultural wars with other groups and 
 
                                                 
35 I. Yosmaoglu, "Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in 
Ottoman Macedonia," International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 1 (Feb, 2006), 55. 
36 Wimmer, The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory, 970–
1022. 
37 Taras and Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict : The International Dimension, 7. 
38 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States : Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 5. 
39 A. Wimmer, L. Cederman and B. Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational 
Analysis of a New Global Data Set," American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (Apr, 2009), 321. 
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even to genocide.”40 The making and remaking of ethnic boundaries often leads different 
groups to have conflicting claims of valuable resources: territory, population, political 
power, historic and cultural legacy, etc.  
The concepts of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence are often used interchangeably 
by scholars. Generally, ethnic civil wars include violent armed conflicts where 
incompatibility concerns government and mobilization and/or victimization follows the 
division of society into ethnic groups. Brubaker and Laitin understand ethnic violence as  
Violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not 
a state (or representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic 
difference is integral rather than incidental to that violence, that is in 
which the violence is meaningfully oriented in some way to the different 
ethnicity of the target.41 
Similarly, Levinson understands ethnic conflict as the “violent conflict among groups 
who differ from one another in terms of culture, religion, physical features, or 
language.”42 Ethnic conflict may also be fought among several groups, or between 
factions of the same ethnicity.  
Sambanis defines ethnic conflict as a “war among communities (ethnicities) that 
are in conflict over power relationship that exists between those communities and the 
state.”43 He also agrees with Kaufmann44 that “opposing communities in ethnic civil 
 
 
                                                 
40 Roosens, Creating Ethnicity : The Process of Ethnogenesis, 18. The question then becomes, why 
people believe the provocative narratives of opportunistic politicians? Kalyvas makes a valuable point that 
the followers (local population, the perpetrators, collaborators, etc.) accept aggressive agendas and 
participate in violence because they see their own utility, like eliminating  rivals, obtaining access to 
valuable local resources, etc. (Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War). 
41 Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," Annual Review of 
Sociology 24 (1998), 428. 
42 David Levinson, Ethnic Relations : A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-
CLIO, 1994), 62. 
43 Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (2001), 261. 
44  Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 
20, no. 4 (1996), 138. 
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conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders, and citizenship of the state. 
They do not seek to control a state whose identity all sides accept, but rather to redefine 
or divide the state itself.”45 
To determine which civil wars are ethnic, this thesis follows the definition of 
Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset (EAC), which posits that  
Ethnic/nonethnic conflicts are distinguished by the aims of the armed 
organizations and their recruitment and alliance structures. Ethnic wars 
typically involve conflicts over ethno-national self-determination, the 
ethnic balance of power in government, ethno-regional autonomy, ethnic 
and racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other 
cultural rights. […] Regarding recruitment and alliance structures, we 
define ethnic wars as those fought by armed organizations that recruit 
fighters predominantly among their own ethnic group and who forge 
alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliation. For a conflict to be classified as 
ethnic, armed organizations have to both explicitly pursue ethno-
nationalist aims, motivations, and interests and recruit fighters and forge 
alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations.46 
Thus, as opposed to non-ethnic civil wars, in ethnic conflict, decisions regarding the 
choice of victims and the choice of allies largely coincide with ethnic group affiliation. 
First, militants believe and/or claim that they act on behalf of larger ethnic 
groups/communities. Therefore, their understanding of what the group exactly means, 
what is the challenge/threat for the group, etc. is important in shaping militants’ actions. 
Second, the violence is perpetrated only “on the other side of ethnic border,” since 
victimization occurs according to supposed ethnic group attachment.  
A number of problems regarding ethnic group affiliation and ethnic conflict have 
important implications for this thesis. Many studies point to the difficulty of maintaining 
a clear distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic categories in the conflict environment. 
Political entrepreneurs pursuing personal goals may claim that they fight for their kin to 
                                                 
45 As cited in Sambanis, Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1), 261. 
46 Lars-Erik Cederman; Brian Min; Andreas Wimmer, "Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset," 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11797 (accessed 22 October, 2010); Wimmer, Cederman and Min, Ethnic 
Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set, 316; L. Cederman, A. 
Wimmer and B. Min, "Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis," World Politics 62, no. 1 
(2010): 87. 
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increase legitimacy, sympathy and support for their struggle. For example, Tishkov 
argues that “because of the multi-ethnic composition of almost all major areas of the 
former Soviet Union […], practically all kinds of conflicts and clashes—social or 
political […]—easily acquire an ethnic manifestation and flavor.”47 However, before the 
collapse of  the Soviet Union when it was supportive (at least clandestinely) of 
communist revolutions abroad, many explicitly ethno-nationalist and separatist 
movements were led by Marxist/communist political movements, and could have been 
called leftist as much as nationalist.48 
Also, ethnic groups in conflict are often viewed as whole cohesive communities, 
as unitary actors, or at least as having a high degree of connectivity between its members. 
But ethnicity may have a different meaning and salience across its membership, and 
different subgroups within ethnicity may pursue “hard-line” or “moderate” agendas with 
different implications for conflict dynamics. For example, in the Rwandan Hutu-Tutsi 
conflict, many moderate Hutu were killed along with Tutsi. Kalyvas identifies two 
mechanisms—identity shift and ethnic defection—through which ethnic lines may be 
crossed in conflict and members of one ethnic group may end up fighting each other.49 
Also, the factors leading to formation of ethnic identity or group allegiance are often 
endogenous to the conflict: the fact that co-ethnics fight for their shared cause influences 
in-group cohesion and salience of their group affiliation.50  
So, can “ethnic” only conflicts be defined as situations where groups demonstrate 
a high degree of cohesion, or can this definition also include cases characterized by 
factional infighting within ethnic groups? At what point in time should the search begin 
for salient and cohesive ethnic identity—before, during, or immediately after the conflict, 
and why? These dilemmas suggest that the existing framework of ethnic conflict is not 
ideal. Ethnicity in ethnic conflict cannot be viewed as an absolute determinant of division 
                                                 
47 S. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 8 (2008): 1043; 
Kumar Rupesinghe and Valerii Aleksandrovich Tishkov, Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World 
(New York: United Nations University Press, 1996), 38. 
48 Kurdish PKK and the Baloch national movement are two examples of this.  
49 Kalyvas, Ethnic Defection in Civil War, 1043. 
50 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 3. 
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between opponents, or as an absolute motivation for action. Still, if participants believe 
and accept this division, it may actually become self-fulfilling. And as long as the 
overwhelming majority of decisions and actions within a conflict are informed by ethnic 
factors, it is useful to analyze these conflicts within a separate category.  
Conceptually, there is a lack of agreement as to how civil wars should be 
systematized. Some scholars divide them into coups, popular revolutions, and peripheral 
insurgencies,51 or ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts,52 however, it is also argued that the 
closer one looks at the civil wars, the harder it is to clearly distinguish them from other 
types of political violence due to the arbitrariness in definitions dealing with particular 
cases.53  
Weidmann distinguishes two forms of ethnic civil wars: group versus group 
“symmetric” warfare under conditions of state failure or collapse and group vs state 
(including cases where state is closely associated with another group) “asymmetric” 
conflict under relatively strong state authority.54 Levinson classifies the following types 
of conflict: separatism, irredentism, conquest, and the fight for political autonomy, 
power, control, or survival.55  
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min distinguish four types of ethnic conflicts: “conflict 
over access to state power between the leaders of competing ethnic communities, 
secession from existing states in order to establish a new state ruled in the name of a 
 
 
                                                 
51 James D. Fearon, "Why do some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?," Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (2004),:275–301. 
52 Sambanis, Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Inquiry (Part 1), 259–282. 
53 For a detailed discussion of the problems of conceptualizing the civil wars, see Sambanis, What is 
Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, 814–858.; Doug 
McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).  
54 To use Weidmann’s term (Nils Benedikt Weidmann, "Critical Configurations: Settlement Patterns 
and Ethnic Violence" ETH), 141, http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/show?type=diss&nr=18257 (accessed 
September 28, 2010), which is also articulated in Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War,. 
55 Levinson, Ethnic Relations : A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia, 63–64. 
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particular ethnic group or to join another state controlled by ethnic kin, and competition 
between new states over mixed territories inhabited by members of their respective ethnic 
core groups.”56  
By definition, the focus of this thesis will be on asymmetric ethnic conflicts, 
where one side is represented by the state. In some instances, the government may be so 
weak that its capabilities are practically equal or even less than of its opponent, but even 
such states maintain the potential advantage of legitimate international aid. As a 
recognized member of the international community, they can request external assistance 
in dealing with ethnic insurgency, while most of the time ethnic rebels must generate 
support outside the legal mechanisms. Also, the analysis will primarily concentrate on 
secessionist conflicts and conflicts over access to state power, which arguably have 
become the prevailing forms of ethnic civil wars.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis assumes that ethnicity is a socially constructed category, which varies 
in salience and meaning over time and space, and from one individual to another. The 
constructivist idea that individuals can cross the line between different ethnicities 
implicitly underscores that such lines exist. Ethnic war thus results not from “ancient 
hatreds,” but rather from contemporary disagreement over power relations or claims to 
valuable assets, including territory, natural and human resources, history and cultural 
legacy.57  
As for the analytic concept, ethnic civil war is far from being an ideal category. 
Still, despite its ambiguities, the distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars 
remains informative and valid, and therefore the primary analysis in the thesis will 
maintain this division. This study will largely adopt the definition of ethnic conflict 
maintained in the Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset, and concentrate on ethnic civil war as a 
category of interethnic violence distinct from communal clashes and genocides. The 
                                                 
56 Cederman, Wimmer and Min, Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis,  92. 
57 For example, there is an ongoing debate between Russian and Ukrainian scholars about whether 
famous classic writers Bulgakov and Gogol belong to Russian or Ukrainian cultural heritage. 
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major focus here is on ethnic civil war in a specific environment, which informs the 
actors’ decisions in ways that are unique to this type of conflict. Recognizing the possible 
co-linearity of the different measures of severity of conflicts, the intensity of violence in 
ethnic civil wars will be measured by total and daily numbers of battle related deaths, 
according to the UCDP/PRIO definition. 
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III. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
This chapter offers an analysis of the limited available research that has been done 
so far on the question of the intensity of civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It also reviews 
other existing approaches to studying civil conflict in terms of these approaches’ 
applicability for future use in dealing with the problems of severity and intensity of the 
ethnic wars. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to increase the understanding of ethnic 
war causes and dynamics, which would further allow for developing effective strategies 
for reducing intensity and avoiding the potentially extensive human costs of ethnic wars. 
It is established that within the ongoing debate between proponents of opportunity 
and motivation mechanisms in explaining the incidence of civil wars, variables related to 
potential grievances (level of democracy, polarization, etc.) have generally more 
explanatory power regarding intensity of conflict than opportunity measures (including 
factors related to potential strength of state or rebels, proportion of mountainous terrain); 
however, too little research has been done to provide a definitive answer to this question. 
This chapter argues that among the wide range of frameworks that exist to explain ethnic 
wars, a relatively new study of the relationship between ethnic groups’ settlement 
patterns and the incidence of ethnic conflict is one of the most promising approaches to 
developing a theoretic framework for explaining the varying intensity of these conflicts.  
Based on the level of conceptual aggregation, the studies of civil wars and ethnic 
conflicts fall into one of three categories: quantitative research, disaggregated analyses, 
and qualitative case studies and anthropological accounts. Quantitative literature that 
operates on the macro-level using multi-variate statistics and regression analysis “has its 
own severe limitations imposed by data constraints and so should be seen as 
complementing qualitative in-country research rather than supplanting it.”58 Moreover, 
the overwhelming majority of quantitative literature is concerned with explaining the 
                                                 
58 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and 
Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 2. 
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causes of outbreak, duration,59 or cessation60 of conflict, but not the difference in the 
scope of violence. The case studies and anthropological accounts may provide a wealth of 
information on particular conflicts, but, when dealing with unique details, they usually 
produce case-specific explanations that have to be treated with caution when applied to 
other cases. The disaggregated studies attempt to bring large-n studies to meso- and 
micro-levels, but they are rare because of a lack of complete and accurate information. 
Any research concerning the onset of civil conflict that is applied to the question 
of conflict intensity has to be done with caution. As Kalyvas argues, it is wrong to use 
theories about the onset of conflict to explain the violence during and as a result of 
conflict. Kalyvas notes that “the causes of violence in civil war cannot be subsumed 
under the causes of civil war; hence a theory of civil wars cannot be a theory of violence 
in civil wars—and vice versa.”61 Lacina adds that “factors that make a country high risk 
for civil war may not have much predictive power for explaining variation in deaths 
among civil wars.”62  
Still, the existing literature does not have to be disregarded altogether. First, the 
way many scholars code the onset of conflict indicates that they may actually be 
analyzing severe conflicts against cases of no violence and low intensity violence. The 
threshold of 1000 battle related deaths per conflict, often employed to include the conflict 
in analysis,63 may be rather high. Reaching this threshold may actually correlate with the 
                                                 
59 Fearon, Why do some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?, 275–301; Paul Collier, Anke 
Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 
(2004): 253–273. 
60 Berenice A. Carroll, "How Wars End: An Analysis of some Current Hypotheses," Journal of Peace 
Research 6, no. 4,(1969): 295–321; Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated 
Settlements to Intrastate Wars," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 1 (1999): 3–22; Nicholas 
Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, "What's in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?," 
International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 82–118. 
61 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 20. 
62 Lacina, Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars, 280. 
63 For example, this number was used in the Correlates of War Project 
(http://www.correlatesofwar.org/), and in the following article: James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 
"Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90. 
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escalation in an ongoing conflict that has been present for years.64 Second, the factors that 
are often associated with the conflict onset are not dichotomous. Therefore, the greater 
degree of a factor may be associated not only with the onset, but with the greater intensity 
of the conflict. For example, one may assume that the availability of external support not 
only instigates rebels to initiate violent strife, but it makes them more capable to inflict 
casualties on the opponent and, thus, the more violent the conflict becomes.  
A. OVERVIEW OF GENERAL LITERATURE ON CIVIL WARS AND 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
As it has already been mentioned, the arguments made concerning the onset of 
civil war and ethnic conflict can be subsumed under two major categories—motivation 
and opportunity mechanisms. The first approach stresses that civil war is likely when 
grievances are severe enough (i.e., “ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, 
political exclusion, and economic inequality”).65 The second approach stemming from 
economic theory emphasizes the opportunity (or feasibility) of conflict, arguing that 
motives like greed are so common that any opportunity for profitable rebellion will be 
exploited by someone:66 “grievance may favor rebellion by leading nonactive rebels to 
help in hiding the active rebels. But all the guerillas really need is superior local 
knowledge, which enables them to threaten reprisals for denunciation.”67 
Within the first tradition, a group of scholars argue that conflicts are more likely 
where there are deprived groups. They assert that democracy is negatively associated 
                                                 
64 There are many conceptual and practical challenges related to the coding of civil wars. For a 
detailed review of the problem, see Sambanis, What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities 
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with conflict,68 while “high degrees of ethnic diversity contradict the assumption of 
cultural homogeneity on which modern nation-states are based, thus triggering waves of 
separatist wars and ethnic cleansings.”69 Under the motivation/grievances umbrella one 
can also include a vast array of arguments, from identity threat and “ancient hatreds”70 to 
security and prisoners’ dilemmas71 to horizontal and regional economic inequalities72 and 
“exclusion theory”73. The greater the deprivation or grievances, the more motivated an 
ethnic group should be to initiate conflict, suffer losses and inflict harm. Of course, these 
grievances have to be properly exploited by mobilizing social groups through framing.74  
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By contrast, Fearon and Laitin argue that “the factors that explain which countries 
have been at risk for civil war are […] the conditions that favor the insurgency. These 
include poverty—which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also 
favors rebel recruitment—political instability, rough terrain, and large populations.”75 
Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler76 emphasize opportunity, but do not reject the 
possibility that the opportunity can be used both by “greedy” and “aggrieved” rebels, “as 
long as perceived grievances are sufficiently widespread to be common across societies 
and time.”77 Their statistically significant predictors of conflict are 1) a share of primary 
commodity exports (provide opportunities for extortion and sustaining rebellion), 2) 
external support (Diasporas and hostile foreign governments as alternative sources of 
finance), 3) male secondary education enrollment, the gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita and growth rate (as proxies for poverty which reduces costs for rebellion), and 4) 
dispersed population and mountainous terrain (as weakening government military 
capabilities). As factors that support both opportunity and motivation mechanism, they 
emphasize the size of a country’s population and the “ethnic dominance” that occurs 
when one ethnic group consists of the majority in a country.78 
In a recent study, Collier et al79 attempted to find further confirmation of the 
“feasibility hypothesis,” which argues that irrelevant of actual motivations of the rebels, 
“where the civil war is feasible, it will occur.”80 Using new refined data, they obtained 
additional support for this mechanism in newly tested factors (countries under the French 
security umbrella and a proportion of young men in the population), while previously 
introduced variables remained significant too (volume, growth and structure of income, 
proportion of terrain which is mountainous, and population size).81 However, along with 
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the economic factors, two other variables were, in principle, interpreted as both pointing 
to opportunity and motivation: mountainous regions may be poor and indicate regional 
inequalities in distribution of welfare and many young males may be exploited by elders 
or present unemployment problem.82 
How do these two concepts (motivation versus opportunity) operate in relation to 
battle severity? Unfortunately, very little work has been done to give a definite answer to 
this question. Lacina finds that variables related to potential grievances significantly 
outperform opportunity measures. Factors that are related to the potential strength of a 
state or rebels (military quality, GDP, and proportion of mountainous terrain), and thus 
proxy opportunity (feasibility), have no predictive power regarding the intensity of a 
conflict.83 
Greater democracy is associated with significantly fewer battle deaths, which 
supports the motivation thesis.84 It is suggested that democracy affects potential severity 
of fighting through public opinion, normative pressure, and institutional checks, which 
prevent the leaders from letting the conflict escalate too much. It also forces them to 
“grant concessions when faced with a severe insurgent threat.”85 Democracies may also 
be better equipped for negotiations, co-optation, or containment of rebels. “By contrast, 
in nondemocracies, challengers may assume that their best hope of achieving their goals 
is military victory or the collapse of the current regime and accordingly choose more 
deadly tactics.”86 
However, in line with the opportunity argument, it is established that “availability 
of foreign aid and intervention”87 significantly increases the severity of war. This finding 
supports earlier research of Sislin and Pearson who also claim that arms acquisition by 
                                                 
82 Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War, 22.  
83 Lacina, Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars, 286. 
84 Ibid., 287. 
85 Ibid., 282.  
86 Ibid., 283.  
87 Ibid., 286. 
  27
ethnic groups tends to be correlated with more intense fighting: external arms supply and 
availability of arms to groups in conflict seem to lead to a greater intensity of fighting.88  
Fearon and Laitin’s ethnic and religious fractionalization index,89 often used to 
proxy ethnic cleavages, poorly performed as a predictor for intensity of conflict.90 Greater 
ethnic polarization (that is, if at least 8 percent of the population is an ethnic minority), 
but not religious polarization, is correlated with fewer battle deaths.91 At the same time, 
both employed measures are argued not to capture the important dimensions of ethnic 
identity: “First, not all ethnic groups matter for politics. Second, ethnic conflicts are not 
the outcome of everyday encounters between individuals; they are the result of 
interactions between the state and ethnopolitical movements that challenge state 
authority.”92 Moreover, even from a strictly demographic perspective, “…contrary to 
expectations, the bulk of the quantitatively oriented literature fails to establish a clear 
association between ethnicity and civil war, even in wars that are commonly identified as 
‘ethnic’ wars.”93 Another measure of ethnic cleavages has been suggested: the ethnic 
polarization, or Reynal-Querol (RQ), index, which increases as a society is divided 
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between fewer and larger distinct ethnic groups.94 The RQ index is found to be a better 
predictor of civil conflict than the Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. 95  
The debate over the impact of ethnicity even in “ethnic” conflicts is an example of 
general problems with the quantitative approaches. It is argued that these studies “tend to 
overaggregate the dependent variable and treat ethnic conflicts as though they have 
uniform causes.”96 Kalyvas notes that “much work neglects the fact that there is no 
necessary overlap between the micro- and the macrolevels. The current emphasis on the 
macrolevel implies that “on-the-ground” dynamics are perceived as a rather irrelevant 
local manifestation of the macrolevel. Local actors are seen as local replicas of central 
actors.”97 As Kalyvas emphasizes,  
This neglect has several causes: a division of labor separating the tasks of 
collecting evidence at the microlevel and interpreting macrodynamics; an 
epistemic preference that marginalizes the particular; and the 
interpretation of microlevel dynamics in the language of the master 
cleavage. […] In other words, violence in an “ethnic” or “class war” is not 
an automatically or necessarily ethnic or class violence. This is not to say 
that ethnic, religious, or class allegiances are false or irrelevant, but, 
rather, that their effect varies considerably across time and space within 
the same civil war, and that their consolidation is often the outcome rather 
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Overall, this thesis agrees with Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch that 
“influential studies in the political-economy tradition have relied heavily on materialist 
interpretations of civil wars at the country level while downplaying specific interactions 
involving ethnic groups.”99  
B. DISAGGREGATED APPROACHES AND SPECIFIC LITERATURE ON 
ETHNIC SETTLEMENT PATTERNS 
Recent disaggregated research attempts to address the above mentioned 
deficiencies of previous studies by testing hypotheses on incidence of civil wars using 
meso- and micro-level data related to the various aspects of conflicts. Instead of using 
country-level information, scholars collect and utilize actor-specific and event-specific 
data, with a focus on regional and local characteristics in social, political, economic, 
military, or geographic spheres. There are many increasingly successful attempts to 
employ geo-coded data, related to various types and locations of conflicts, separate 
violent events,100 natural resources,101 various characteristics of major actors,102 etc., on 
civil wars. 
Using a disaggregated approach to analyze power relations between ethnic 
groups, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min show that, contrary to the opportunity logic, ethnic 
identities have a significant impact on a group’s political allegiance and its access to 
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power.103 Following similar logic, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch demonstrate the 
viability of a link between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict: “both advanced and 
backward ethnic groups are more likely to experience such conflicts than those groups 
whose wealth lies closer to the national average.”104 In the same vein, Buhaug, 
Cederman, and Rød confirm that “exclusion of powerful ethnic minorities increases the 
likelihood of conflict considerably.105  
The above mentioned studies attempt to consolidate the motivation and 
opportunity mechanism within “exclusion theory,” positing that “competition and 
exclusion concern control over the state and the public goods and services at its disposal. 
[…] Ethnic politics simultaneously concerns material interests, such as access to 
government controlled jobs, services, and contracts; idealist motives such as the 
recognition of one’s ethnic heritage by the state; and genuine political goals, such as 
access to state power.”106 Wimmer, Cederman, and Min claim that “previous research has 
examined primarily the relationship between individual inequality and conflict, and 
disregarded how the relationship between inequality and ethnic cleavages influence 
motivation and opportunities for collective action and mobilization.”107  
Thus, ethnic conflict becomes likely in three configurations: 1) when “the center 
of power becomes more ethnically segmented,”108 2) when large ethnic groups are 
excluded from power, and 3) “in incoherent states where the population is not 
accustomed to direct rule of the political center,”109 leading to secessionist conflicts. 
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Later research complements this list with conditions that exclude ethnic groups who also 
face high risk of conflict when they have large kin groups in contiguous countries.110 
Following opportunity logic, Toft uses the “Minorities at Risk” Project data111 on 
settlement patterns of ethnic groups to argue that probability of civil war increases if 
“ethnic minority demands sovereignty over the territory it occupies, and the state sees this 
territory as indivisible from the rest of the state’s territory.”112 Toft’s conclusions are 
confirmed by Weidmann, Rød and Cederman,113 who constructed a geocoded dataset of 
ethnic settlement patterns (the “Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups” (GREG) Project) 
based on maps from the Atlas Narodov Mira,114 as well as in Weidmann’s more detailed 
study115 of ethnic settlement patterns. Weidmann’s analysis showed that territorial 
concentration does not have statistical significance in explaining the conflict onset, while 
the concentration of ethnically kin population does correlate with a higher risk of conflict. 
As he states, “population dispersion receives a negative and significant coefficient, 
whereas territorial concentration has no effect.”116 
Why do groups comprised of fewer clusters face a smaller risk of conflict? 
Legitimacy of an ethnic group’s claims and its capabilities to achieve its goals are 
directly influenced by the group’s settlement patterns. Groups living as a concentrated 
majority face much greater risk of conflict than others. The groups that are the second 
most disposed to conflicts are the ones with concentrated minorities, while urban and 
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dispersed groups are the least risk-prone. The above mentioned research attempts to 
demonstrate that an ethnic group can only make legitimate claims to well-defined 
territory with clearly demarcated boundaries: “the escalation of violence up to the level of 
ethnic war can occur only if there is mass support in the group population for conflict. 
However, for mass mobilization to be possible, the group population must believe that 
the cause for fighting is justified. This condition is more likely to hold for concentrated 
groups.”117 Thus, territorial concentration increases a group’s motivations. Population 
concentration, on the other hand, leads to greater intra-group interaction and cohesion, 
and increases a group’s capabilities for mobilization by facilitating coordination of 
collective actions, containing dissent, and reducing organizational costs.118 
Both Toft119 and Weidmann120 maintain that ethnic settlement patterns should be 
part of any explanation of ethnic conflict. Although Toft only argues that territory 
“informs the motives of actors,” and “… helps us to better understand the emergence of 
violence”121 (emphasis added), territorial distribution of a population may have an 
equally important, but not analogous, effect on the intensity of conflict.  
The previous findings have to be carefully re-examined regarding the varying 
intensities of ethnic wars because structural conditions like settlement patterns may have 
a different affect on war dynamics than on pre-conflict dynamics. As Kalyvas 
emphasizes, war and peace are very different settings,122 and an initial outbreak of violent 
contention does not always tell us how violent the episode will be. For example, in Toft’s 
analysis, many of the cases where significant violence had been recorded were either not 
included in the analysis or were outliers.123 Many cases that indicated high rebel activity 
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were missing observations on settlement patterns and thus were dropped. These include 
the following: Bosnia and Croats and Serbs; Croatia and Serbs; Afghanistan and Hazaras, 
Pashtuns and Uzbeks; Angola and Ovimbundu; Burma and Mons; India and Bodos; Iraq 
and Shi’is; Lebanon and Palestinians; Niger and Tuareg; Philippines and Igorots; Somalia 
and Issaq; Togo and Ewe; Uganda and Acholi. Several other instances indicated 
dispersed groups with high rebel activity: Hutus in Burundi, Sunnis in Lebanon, and 
Tutsis in Rwanda. There were many cases listed in Appendix 2124 that indicated groups 
with concentrated settlement patterns who experienced no rebellion (i.e., Crimean 
Russians, Hungarians in Yugoslavia, Alawi in Syria, Zulus and Coloreds in South Africa, 
Yakuts, Tuvinians and Tatars in Russia, Yoruba, Ogani and Ibo in Nigeria, Basters in 
Namibia, Luhya in Kenya, and many others).  
Contrary to Weidmann’s finding that the onset of conflict is associated with 
concentrated ethnic groups, Toft demonstrates that the location of most of the violence in 
the Bosnian civil war was in ethnically diverse areas: “Locations with a high level of 
ethnic contestation tend to see more confrontations between armed forces as groups 
struggle for control of a unit, but these locations are also more susceptible to one-sided 
violence against civilians.”125 Although initial mobilization and escalation of ethnic 
conflict might have taken place in more ethnically homogeneous locales, the areas that 
saw more violence were not characterized by ethnic homogeneity or centralization. On 
the contrary, most violence occurred in areas of ethnic cohabitation and intermingling.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Apparently, the existing cacophony of approaches and arguments hinges on 
precise and comprehensive data collection and interpretation. The deficit of accurate 
information on the civil wars and ethnic conflicts will continue to affect the credibility of 
research results. Most of the existing research has focused on important, but general, 
questions regarding the onset of ethnic war, leaving the question of conflict intensity 
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under-researched. Despite these deficiencies, the disaggregated approach is better suited 
to answer specific questions about civil wars and ethnic conflicts because it attempts to 
capture case-specific characteristics and employ more fine-grained data analysis. One 
such pending question is why are some ethnic conflicts much deadlier than others.  
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IV. THEORETIC FRAMEWORK 
In the previous chapter, the existing approaches to explaining civil wars and 
ethnic conflicts were examined. As it has become apparent, there is large gap in the 
literature regarding explanations for the varying intensity of violence in ethnic civil wars. 
The potential factors that increase conflict severity include Diasporas and the availability 
of external support, including arms supplies, state weakness, rough terrain, population 
density. Other demographic factors were also linked to an increase in conflict severity: 
degrees of polarization, horizontal inequality and exclusion from political power, and 
territorial concentration and population concentration of ethnic groups. However, most of 
the documented are related to the pre-conflict dynamics. As Kalyvas argues, “Conflating 
violence in the context of contentious action with civil war violence suggests a failure to 
recognize that war and peace are radically different contexts that induce and constrain 
violence in very different ways.”126  
Therefore, a distinct theoretic framework is needed to explain the difference in the 
intensity of ethnic conflicts. In order to contribute to such theory with an important, but 
by no means complete, explanation of conflict intensity, this thesis will focus on 
settlement patterns as structural conditions that affect both strategic decisions made by 
conflicting actors (motivational mechanism), and the ways these decisions are 
implemented (organizational mechanism). 
To expound the proposed framework that potentially links ethnic settlements to 
the intensity of conflict, this chapter will first outline the general hypothesis and two 
mechanisms that link settlement patterns to intensity. Then, after brief discussion of 
possible scale of ethnic intermingling, two refined hypotheses will be introduced, which 
are related to local and regional intermingling. The last two sections of the chapter will be 
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devoted to the discussion of other factors potentially affecting conflict intensity, and 
indicators that could potentially allow recognizing the proposed opportunity and 
organizational mechanisms in particular ethnic conflicts.  
A. THE HYPOTHESIS ON ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS AND INTENSITY OF 
CIVIL WAR 
As a point of analytical departure, this thesis will begin by considering the 
following argument: An analysis of structural conditions that may lead nationalism into 
war has suggested that “The more densely nationalities are intermingled, the greater the 
risk of war.”127 In this exact formulation, this hypothesis applies only to the onset of 
conflict, and does not distinguish conflicts by their intensity. Moreover, it contradicts the 
argument that most ethnic groups cooperate most of the time128 along with the finding 
that the “security dilemma” in interethnic relations is insignificant,129 as well as the 
conclusion regarding the high risk of concentrated ethnic groups to experience 
conflict.130 However, the mentioned hypothesis may have applicability to the intensity of 
inter-ethnic fighting after the onset of conflict, if rephrased in the following way:  
H1: Once the ethnic conflict has started, the more densely ethnicities are 
intermingled, the greater the intensity of warfare. 
If most ethnic groups coexist peacefully most of the time, and if concentrated 
ethnically homogeneous settlements increase the risk of conflict onset, then why would 
intermingling be associated with more intense fighting? How does the conflict 
environment change the mechanism of ethnic interactions? 
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The “security dilemma,” which is at the core of the “risky intermingling” 
argument, stems from a similar neorealist concept originating in international relations 
theory. This concept is based on the assumptions of an anarchic system and a power 
balance as the source of security under which actors interact. While these assumptions 
may have questionable application for states in peacetime, they definitely pertain to the 
internal dynamics of ethnic civil war, which are characterized by the emergence of 
unconstrained alternative centers of coercive power that challenge established authority: 
Contentious action represents a challenge to the government in place in a 
context characterized by an undeniable monopoly of violence by the state. 
In contrast, the defining characteristic of civil war is the absence of such 
monopoly.131  
Many ethnic conflicts are characterized by a large-scale victimization of civilians: 
“a considerable amount of violence in civil wars lacks conventional military utility and 
does not take place on the battlefield.”132 Since one or more sides in ethnic conflict 
identify with a certain ethnic group(s), this distinction will inform the actions of both 
combatants and noncombatants in two ways. First, militants are likely to operate along 
the lines of corresponding ethnic division and exploit local co-ethnics, irrespective of the 
latter’s actual motives or preferences. Second, even if this is not what militants are 
actually doing, in the absence of reliable counterfactual information, it still remains the 
likely assumption that both the government and the population are going to make. If, 
based on this assumption, the government directs its counterstrategy against the ethnic 
group that is supposedly backing the insurgents, the ethnic division becomes self-
reinforcing. 
Mass mobilization capabilities of ethnic groups, which are deemed crucial for the 
onset of ethnic conflict, lose their importance when considering the intensity of violence 
after the initiation of hostilities. During the war, most of the population remains passive, 
and only a relatively small numbers of militants are needed to carry out violence and 
sustain insurgency. For example, riots that required extensive (although sometimes 
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spontaneous) political mobilization almost ceased after the insurgency started in Sri 
Lanka and Punjab.133 Perhaps level of cohesion and transaction costs remain important 
for the eventual success of the ethnic conflict, but the intensity of fighting may not be 
directly related to the overall number of supporters. For example, “the active support of a 
large portion of the public is usually not required to carry out mass killing. The killing 
itself is almost always performed by military or paramilitary organizations, often with 
little more than the passive acceptance of the rest of society—including members of the 
perpetrators’ own social groups.” 134 
The actual role of the “passive supporters,” however, may vary significantly, 
since militants need accurate local information to identify targets and avoid being singled 
out by authorities. It is argued that violence in civil wars results from the convergence of 
the local population’s intimate interests and motives, and the militants’ efforts to exploit 
tactical advantage and establish full control over certain territory. 135 Both insurgents and 
the government need collaborators and denunciators, who constitute a “typically 
overlooked […] large ‘gray zone’ populated by those who partake in the process of 
violence in a variety of ways without, however, being directly involved in its outcome, as 
either perpetrators or victims.”136 
Therefore, ethnically diverse populations play a dual role in ethnic conflicts: on 
the one hand, it constitutes possible collaborators and denunciators; on the other hand, it 
constitutes the pool of feasible victims. Ethnic affiliation becomes crucial for drawing 
lines between these two categories since possible collaborators with insurgents become 
feasible victims of the government, and vice versa. Thus, greater intermingling of ethnic 
groups creates a larger potential pool of victims and collaborators. 
                                                 
133 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War,  23. 
134 Benjamin Valentino, "Final Solutions: The Causes of Mass Killing and Genocide," Security 
Studies 9, no. 3 (2000): 3. 
135 The theory of violence in civil wars that is built on this logic is described in Kalyvas, The Logic of 
Violence in Civil War. 
136 Ibid., 21. 
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B. THE MECHANISMS THAT LINK SETTLEMENT PATTERNS TO 
INTENSITY 
In a situation where distinct ethnic groups engage in conflict, their patterns of 
settlement present a strategic challenge for the warring parties through at least two 
distinct mechanisms. The first mechanism is related to opportunity and threat, and treats 
intensity of conflict and casualty counts as premeditated damage. Fear and competition 
become increasingly pronounced during conflicts and they eventually inform the 
decisions of the ethnic groups.137 The more that the opponents’ population bases is 
intermixed, the harder it becomes to protect their own population and the easier the target 
the opponent’s population becomes. Mixed settlements, “in conjunction with unequal and 
shifting power, will often produce incentives for preventive war.” 138 Similarly, it is 
emphasized that “intermingling raises the risk of communal conflict during the struggle 
for national freedom, as groups that would be trapped as minorities in a new national 
state oppose its reach for freedom.” 139   
This mechanism operates both on the strategic and tactical levels, inducing armed 
bands to conduct what they may declare preventive or retaliatory attacks, rescue 
missions, etc. Victimization of the local population on the basis of their ethnic attachment 
may pursue different goals, including personal gain. The particular motivation becomes 
less relevant than objectively existing conditions, which allow such goals to be achieved 
by the very proximity of targets and “windows of opportunity” presented by the weak 
protection of these targets. They make the logic of such motivations sound feasible. 
The second, organizational, mechanism views greater intensity of conflict in more 
mixed communities as collateral damage. Arguably, “the vulnerability of civilians makes 
it possible for small bands of fanatics to initiate conflict. Because they are small and 
fanatical, these bands are hard to control.”140 Interspersed ethnic groups are likely to 
produce an abundance of small, disconnected and loosely organized militant units, which 
                                                 
137 Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47. 
138 Ibid., 43. 
139 Van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalism and War, 38. 
140 Posen, The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict, 33. 
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are virtually impossible to effectively manage and command, and, subsequently, 
impossible to control the damage. The very nature of disconnected settlement patterns 
does not allow insurgents to establish stable lines of communication, along with 
command and control. At the same time, in many cases of interethnic violence, 
independent or loosely controlled armed units were responsible for most of the casualties, 
as in the ethnic wars in former Yugoslavia.141 Comparing the Mau Mau rebellion in 
Kenya to the Yellow revolution in the Philippines, other authors also suggested that,  
Contrast in the locus and degree of centralized brokerage in the two cases 
(high in Philippines; low in Kenya) may help to account for the much 
higher levels of violence in Mau Mau than the Yellow revolution. For 
example, formal organizations may be more inclined to avoid violence 
than insurgent groups that are organized less formally and in more 
decentralized fashion.142  
Therefore, the first mechanism posits that mixed settlements increase the cost of 
achieving superiority and control over the territory by the warring party, since all the 
enemy population must be displaced, killed, or subdued. The second mechanism posits 
that mixed settlements prevent establishing an “accountable” insurgent organization, and 
thus increase the amount of collateral damage. It is difficult to distinguish which 
mechanism is responsible for more damage and more intense fighting. Here, it is only 
argued that where settlement patterns of ethnic groups are more intermingled, these two 
mechanisms are likely to interplay and produce greater casualties. 
C. THE SCOPE OF ETHNIC INTERMINGLING AND QUALIFIED 
HYPOTHESES 
The argument concerning the two different types of intermingling of ethnic 
groups, on the regional and local scale, can further be considered, if this study adapts its 
reasoning to the problem of conflict intensity: 
                                                 
141 Ejub Stitkovac, "Croatia: The First War," in Burn this House: The Making and Unmaking of 
Yugoslavia, ed. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 
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(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 174–214. 
142 Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 121. 
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Elites can lose control of events when intermingling extends to the local 
level: conflict can flare against the wishes of elites when unofficial killers 
seize the agenda by sparking a spiral of private violence. […] Overall, 
local intermingling is more dangerous. 
The most dangerous pattern of regional intermingling is one that leaves 
elements of one or both groups insecurely at the mercy of the other, but 
also allows for the possibility of forcible rescue—either by self-rescue 
(secession) or external rescue (intervention by an already-free 
homeland).143 
The regional scale of intermingling implies that “regions are heterogeneous, small 
communities are homogeneous,”144 and intermingling is considered local if “even small 
communities are heterogeneous.”145 However, these two types of settlement patterns and 
ethnic intermingling are more analytic categories than actual distinctions. The enclaves of 
an ethnically homogeneous population may continuously vary in size, from only a couple 
of households to villages and city districts to provinces. Therefore, the possible effect of 
settlement patterns on the intensity of warfare is also likely to be continuous, although 
not necessarily linear. Still, this distinction is feasible to adopt for the purposes of the 
analytic research. Based on this logic and building on H1, this thesis formulated two 
refined hypotheses: 
H1a: Once the ethnic conflict has started, more locally mixed settlement patterns 
of ethnic groups increase conflict intensity;  
and  
H1b: Once the ethnic conflict has started, regional intermingling of ethnic groups 
that leave an island of population increases conflict intensity. 
Arguably, these hypotheses provide a useful theoretic framework that can be 
tested empirically using new geo-coded data on ethnic settlement patterns and data on 
battle deaths, as well as through process tracing techniques in specific case studies. 
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The proposed theoretic approach relaxes the unitary actor framework that was 
employed in the majority of previous research. Although the analysis is still focused on 
the group level dependent variable, the measurement of the independent variable is firmly 
based on the assumption that ethnic groups are not homogeneous and unitary actors. 
Essentially, the measurement of the independent variable should reflect to what degree 
the aggregated actor (ethnic group) is heterogeneous, decentralized, and “not unitary.” 
Another major assumption is that in an uncertain and decentralized civil conflict 
environment, it is easier to initiate “violence” than ensure “peace.” Civil war is favorable 
to hit-and-run attacks, assaults on civilians and other poorly protected targets. In order to 
deny the opponent’s ability to conduct such operations, the other side needs substantial 
defensive resources. If actors want to ensure a low level of violence in civil conflicts 
when a lot of vulnerable targets are present, they need numerous forces and a high level 
of control. Thus, a lack of organization and hierarchical control has uneven effects on 
defensive and offensive capabilities of actors: it significantly decreases the defensive 
potential of actors compared to its impact on offensive potential.  
D. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING CONFLICT INTENSITY 
As it has been mentioned earlier, the proposed approach constitutes an 
overarching theory of violence in ethnic conflicts. Thus, the effects of various external 
and endogenous factors will be uneven due to their unique concatenations. A 
comprehensive theory that would satisfactorily explain intensity of ethnic civil wars 
needs to not only incorporate these factors into encompassing framework, but also 
requires much more fine-grained empirical evidence than is currently available to test its 
propositions. Therefore, this thesis is only a step toward the creation of such a theory. It 
is thus argued that the variance in settlement patterns as an independent variable is 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for determining the degree of intensity of 




Other potentially important factors for explaining the intensity of violence in 
ethnic armed conflicts include: 
1) International peacekeeping operations. Arguably, external interference into a 
conflict through peacekeeping operations, especially in the early stages of fighting, has 
the potential for significantly reducing the costs of human lives. Whether peacekeeping is 
an effective measure to resolve the conflict and achieve peace is another matter. But since 
the major goals of peacekeeping include reducing violent clashes between warring 
parties, it may have a negative effect on the amount of committed violence. However, in 
many cases, international peacekeeping operations are conducted under conditions of 
state collapse, or they start only after the conflict has become a major concern for 
international and/or regional stability. In both cases, this usually means that the 
humanitarian impact and human cost of the war are already high.  
2) Availability of arms supplies and other external support. As it was discussed in 
Chapter III, an abundance of small arms is found to correlate with more intense ethnic 
conflicts.146  
3) Level of democracy, degrees of polarization, horizontal inequality and 
exclusion from political power. Coercive regimes may be more prone to employ violence 
towards dissenting ethnicities.147 Higher levels of political discrimination and 
xenophobia may make mass victimization easier to achieve. 
4) Geography. Rough terrain (mountains, dense jungles, swamps, etc.) constrains 
a states’ efforts to destroy insurgency in remote areas, but also impedes frequent or mass 
movement of troops, and makes it easier to protect small villages or escape attack. 
Limited access to certain areas inhibits accurate or complete documenting of the violent 
effects of civil conflicts, thus actual levels of conflict severity may differ from registered 
data. 
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5) Type of conflict and incompatibility. The pool of ethnic conflicts analyzed here 
includes irredentist/secessionist wars, conflicts for political autonomy, group survival and 
more. The fighting may be waged under symmetric or asymmetric conditions. These 
characteristics of major incompatibility and power balance may also be linked to the 
amount of violence in a conflict. 
Other factors may also include variables related to the size and strength of the 
major actors, strategic interaction between the major actors, their master narratives, and 
their framing and mobilization efforts. Some variables (e.g., availability of arms) may be 
easier to measure than others (e.g., framing). However, their discussion deserves separate 
research efforts which exceed the boundaries of this thesis. 
At the same time, two other intuitively important variables seem to have little 
explanatory power:  
6) Duration of episode. Lacina notes that “a faster death rate does not seem to 
generate a countervailing tendency toward shorter conflict. Thus, factors that predict 
large numbers of death should also predict high rates of death.”148  
7) Size of host country population. Lacina also writes that “a larger population 
does not predict a higher number of deaths. The nonrelationship between total deaths and 
total population means that normalizing deaths by population may too heavily discount 
deaths in large countries, as war does not seem to scale up in populous nations.”149 
E. THE INDICATORS RELATED TO THE OPPORTUNITY AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISMS 
How can we identify whether the organizational or motivational mechanisms are 
present in specific instance of ethnic civil war? The indicators (both by case and on a 
global level) that may point to the validity of the specified causal mechanisms can be 
divided into five major categories: 
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1. Indicators Related to Central Actors 
The intensity of violence in an ethnic civil war is expected to be higher, if: 
- central actors choose strategies (including propagating messages and master 
narratives) that target smaller pockets of ethnic “enemy” populations as opposed to larger 
territories; 
- actors claim rights and attempt to seize larger pieces of a territory with a 
dispersed ethnic “enemy” population as opposed to homogeneous parts of an ethnic 
“enemy” territory; 
- central actors exercise inefficient or low control over friendly forces due to their 
dispersion over territory with pockets of “friendly” and “enemy” population;  
- actors define their enemy broadly, as an entire “other” ethnic group, as opposed 
to a smaller, specific political faction or group of political elites. 
2. Indicators Related to Perpetrators 
The intensity of violence in an ethnic civil war is expected to be higher, if: 
- the majority of perpetrators reside and conduct attacks in ethnically 
heterogeneous regions;  
- more centralized or regular forces conduct attacks on small pockets of an enemy 
population, as opposed to attacking larger enclaves of a population; 
- actual perpetrators of violence have unsystematic communication with and 
control from the center. They do not receive direct tactical orders and do not get most of 
their logistics from “the center.” They are organized in small bands and local militias that 
comprise local dwellers and are mostly concerned with “self protection” and/or 
retaliatory attacks, but can also include mercenaries and outsiders. The major obstacle to 
systematic control is the absence of stable land communication due to “intervening” areas 
of ethnic enemy populations; 
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- perpetrators choose tactics based on hit-and-run attacks, looting, “trying” and 
murdering ethnic “others,” coercion and forcing ethnic “others” to flee the area. Overall, 
the amount of small bands and militias is large compared to organized regular forces. 
These small local units are responsible for most of the operations and for most of the 
casualties. More centralized control, coordination and cooperation between units 
increases as ethnic “others” are killed or flee the area, thus making it more ethnically 
homogeneous; 
- perpetrators use their own local knowledge or help from local denunciators to 
find and attack ethnic “enemy” populations, which are unable to mount adequate 
resistance; 
- the actions of small bands and militias do not necessarily reflect or correctly 
interpret the master message and/or the official political position of the top leadership, 
but they use certain logic of inter-ethnic animosity to justify violence towards “others.” 
3. Indicators Related to Victims 
The intensity of violence in an ethnic civil war is expected to be higher, if: 
- most victims are ethnic “others” residing in the areas of ethnic cohabitation, or 
close to areas belonging to enemy population. They reside in smaller communities as 
opposed to larger areas of ethnically kin population;  
- insurgents target ethnic “others” allegedly siding with the government and/or 
government forces target insurgent ethnic group populations; 
- victims also include “collaborators,” or those ethnic kin who express moderate 
views towards government or ethnic “others.” 
4. Indicators Related to the Environment 
The intensity of violence in an ethnic civil war is expected to be higher, if: 
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- the geographic environment and level of infrastructure development (roads, 
communications, etc.) do not allow the establishment of stable communication and 
control over smaller enclaves of ethnically kin population on behalf of either the 
government or insurgency;  
- social environment consists of rural but densely populated areas with dispersed 
heterogeneous population, as opposed to less densely populated or more homogeneous 
areas; 
- islands of ethnically kin communities cannot unite in larger units or networks 
because they are separated by areas inhabited by ethnic “enemy” populations; 
- environment is favorable to offensive operations as opposed to defensive 
operations; 
- environment prevents victims from being able to effectively escape targeting; 
- most violence is committed in areas of cohabitation and not in areas with 
homogeneous population. 
5. Indicators Related to Endogenous Processes of Civil War 
The intensity of violence in an ethnic civil war is expected to be higher, if: 
- the conflict undergoes more escalation/de-escalation shifts as opposed to fewer 
escalations/de-escalations; 
- the conflict experiences upsurges of ethnic violence as opposed to a steady or 
low intensity of warfare. The initial upsurge leads to ethnic cleansing and 
“homogenization” of ethnically diverse areas; 
- there are numerous shifts of control over smaller areas of ethnically 
heterogeneous populations, as opposed to fewer such shifts;  
- sides engage in retaliatory attacks on small enclaves of ethnic “enemy” 
population;  
- spirals of violence target poorly protected civilian populations. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
This list is far from comprehensive and, of course, it requires further scrutiny and 
debate. Furthermore, not all these indicators have to be present in a case in order for it to 
be characterized by a high intensity of violence. Additionally, not all of the indicators can 
be incorporated into analysis with equal success. Still, this list provides a useful starting 
point for further investigation of the possible link between configurations of ethnic 
settlements and violence in ethnic civil wars. Currently, these indicators can be used as 
guidelines for case studies and can be helpful when examining case specific data. Perhaps 
further research could be done to collect systematic information that would capture the 
listed factors, which could then be used to test this data against intensity of ethnic 
conflict. Next, this study will discuss the statistical test of the impact of settlement 
patterns on the intensity of conflict. 
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V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTENSITY OF 
VIOLENCE IN ETHNIC CIVIL WARS 
This chapter describes the process and results of the statistical analysis of the 
possible relationship between settlement patterns and the intensity of violence in ethnic 
civil wars. After a brief discussion of the dependent and independent variables, this 
chapter will go on to explain the process of data collection for the measurement of these 
variables. Additionally, there will be a discussion of the most substantial problems with 
the available data that may affect the statistical regression results. The next section in this 
chapter details the research design for the measuring of the effect of the independent 
variables on the conflict intensity. The concluding part discusses the statistical 
regressions results. Unfortunately, the general findings in this chapter do not provide 
sufficient evidence to either support or reject the proposed hypotheses regarding 
settlement patterns and their affect on the intensity of ethnic civil wars.  
A. WHAT IS TO BE MEASURED? 
For both H1a (local cohabitation) and H1b (regional intermingling), the 
dependent variable (intensity) in this thesis is measured as the total number of recorded 
battle deaths divided by the duration of the conflict in days.150 To calculate the dependent 
variable, this thesis relies on data from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset v.3.0 for the 
period 1946–2008.151 The definition of battle-related deaths used in this dataset and, 
subsequently, employed in this thesis, was provided in Chapter II. The dataset provides 
estimates of annual battle deaths for each conflict, and also includes the dates of initiation 
and the dates of the ending of the wars and, if applicable, the dates of separate conflict 
episodes within the same wars. This allows calculations of both the total severity and the 
duration of conflicts. Included in this analysis were only cases defined by the Ethnic 
                                                 
150 All the variables that were used in the statistical tests are explained in Appendix C.  
151 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset 
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Power Relations (ERP) dataset152 and EAC153 as ethnic conflicts.154 Again, as was 
mentioned earlier, this thesis’ measure of the dependent variable is not perfect because it 
does not include other aspects of violent impacts of ethnic conflicts. The span of intensity 
measures for ethnic conflicts is considerable. However, a very large portion of the civil 
wars, in the dataset, have relatively small intensity and/or total severity:  
 
Figure 2.   The Intensity of Violence in Ethnic Conflicts, in daily battle deaths 
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It is noteworthy that three cases in our subset of ethnic civil wars display 
unusually high intensity of violence, at the same time having relatively small number of 
total deaths and short duration. These are the Bolivian revolution of 1952 (Warid 10101) 
and the attempted coup in Cameroon in 1984 (Warid 25900) that both lasted only 4 days 
and have registered intensity of 431,25 and 125 respectively; and the military coup in 
Syria in 1966 (Warid 20200) that has registered severity of 200 deaths and duration of 
one day. These observations are potential outliers and may mislead the analysis by too 
strongly affecting the regression results. It has been decided to exclude them from 
analysis.  
The explanatory variable for the variance in intensity of ethnic conflict 
investigated in this thesis is the configuration of ethnic settlements (ethnic settlements 
pattern). The arrangement of ethnically homogeneous settlements surrounded by a 
distinct population may vary from smaller to larger pieces of territory continuously: parts 
of village population being ethnically homogeneous → entire villages being ethnically 
homogeneous → ethnically homogenous locales (districts) → ethnically homogeneous 
regions (parts) of a country. The bottom line of this thesis’ argument is that, in civil war, 
more dispersed ethnic groups will be involved in deadlier conflicts. 
B. CREATING THE DATASETS 
To explore the proposed link between settlement patterns and the intensity of 
ethnic conflicts, this thesis uses data from the “Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relations” 
(GeoEPR)155 and “Geo-referencing of ethnic groups” (GREG)156 spatial datasets. These 
datasets provide geo-referenced data on ethnic settlements, which consists of polygons 
that represent areas populated by certain ethnic groups. Using the ArcGIS157 software, 
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this study calculated two separate sets of measures for the independent variable. The 
measures are based on area estimates for polygons, as well as on population estimates 
that were calculated by overlapping the polygon boundaries with the raster data from 
Columbia University Center for International Earth Science Information Network’s 
(CIESIN) Gridded Population of the World (GPW) dataset.158  
GREG was created on the basis of the maps from Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM).159 
The authors of the GeoEPR dataset did not specify the source of their data. In some cases, 
the polygons from the GREG and the GeoEPR coincide, but in others the two datasets 
provide different settlement boundaries for ethnic groups. If two or more ethnic groups 
represented in the GeoEPR live in the same area, their corresponding polygons will 
overlap. The GREG does not allow overlapping of polygons, but delineates polygons 
with two or three groups living together. 
Atlas Narodov Mira, which is the basis of the GREG, includes 57 maps of ethnic 
groups for all the regions of the world. It employs a uniform list of ethnicities across 
countries worldwide. ANM was used as a basis for calculating the index of Ethno-
Linguistic Fractionalization, used in many contemporary studies.160 Overall, the GREG 
includes 929 groups represented by 8,969 polygons: 7,383 polygons in GREG contain 
one group, 1,552 polygons contain two groups, and 34 polygons contain three groups. 
Additionally, 319 groups found in ANM do not have any territorial bases, and are not 
included in the GREG. The largest polygon occupies an area of 6,954,564 km2 and the 
smallest polygon has the size of 0.59 km2.161 
 
                                                 
158 The Gridded Population of the World dataset, http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/ (accessed 22 
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  53
Authors of the dataset point out certain problems that the GREG inherited from 
the ANM:  
1. The ANM does not specify sources of its data. Therefore, it is difficult to 
judge what level of accuracy and confidence its maps provided:  
The source of the information contained in the ANM remains somewhat 
obscure. A short text at the beginning of the volume lists three different 
types of sources: (1) ethnographic and geographic maps assembled by the 
Institute of Ethnography at the USSR Academy of Sciences, (2) 
population census data, and (3) ethnographic publications of government 
agencies. Still, it remains unclear what kind of information was used for 
which maps, and how groups were selected in the first place.162  
2. Large granularity. The accuracy of the GREG hinges on the scales of ANM 
maps, which range from 1:4,000,000 up to 1:15,000,000. Furthermore, even the best 
digitizing effort introduced additional deviation from ANM maps of up to 7.5–10 km.163 
Weidmann also finds mathematic evidence that the ANM maps incorporated data of 
different initial resolutions. For example, there was more detailed data for areas under 
Soviet control than for other parts of the world.164 Therefore, less explored areas of the 
world are most likely covered with more approximate and schematic polygons, which 
may “limit the comparability across countries.”165 
3. Simplification of data. It is assumed that if the territory is assigned to a certain 
group, there are no representatives of other ethnicities there. Arguably, in a substantial 
proportion of polygons it is actually not so. This simplification becomes even more 
important when the GREG data is combined with the geo-referenced Gridded Population 
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of the World dataset166 to obtain population estimates for each group polygon.167 These 
small-in-numbers minorities may actually become the victims of ethnic conflicts, but 
there is no way for their presence to be measured in the GREG dataset. In fact, authors of 
the GREG dataset deliberately excluded some ANM data on sporadic settlements 
represented by points on the ANM maps.  
4. Outdated, problematic group categories, and endogeneity. ANM captures 
an ethnic picture of the world circa 1964. This makes the data useful for this analysis 
since “the ethnic configuration as captured by GREG is causally prior to the majority of 
ethnic conflicts in the post-World War II period.”168 At the same time, conflicts prior to 
that date are probably going to suffer from an endogeneity problem since ethnic 
settlement patterns are greatly influenced by ethnic conflicts.169 To address this 
deficiency, the statistical analysis in this thesis will include separate tests of episodes 
after 1964. Also, because the maps and list of groups were compiled 45 years ago, many 
ethnic categories have become irrelevant or their names have changed. For example, 
Afars in Ethiopia most closely correspond to GREG’s category Danakil. Thus, some 
ethnic categories used in the analysis adopt more modern names used in EPR. 
In its turn, GeoEPR also provides worldwide coverage of ethnic groups. It 
consists of 755 records for 731 ethnic groups from the EPR dataset. Some groups are 
represented by several entries that correspond to different time periods, if substantial 
changes in their settlements were recorded. Each record may consist of numerous 
polygons. It covers only groups that are coded in EPR as “regionally based,” “regional 
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and urban,” or “aggregate.” Boundaries for “dispersed” groups correspond to state 
boundaries.170 Groups coded as “migrant” or “urban” are excluded from the dataset. 
The detailed discussion of the GeoEPR is anticipated in a forthcoming 
publication.171 Form the available information, it remains unclear what sources the 
authors of this publication used to compile the dataset. It also suffers from granularity 
and simplification problems specified for the GREG dataset. For the most part, the 
authors specify time relevance of the polygons that includes years of ethnic civil war in 
which the group participates. However, it is not clear whether polygons more accurately 
capture settlement patterns before, during, or after the conflict. Since war may have a 
large impact on ethnic settlements, the problem of endogeneity persists.  
The EAC and EPR datasets link ethnic conflicts to politically relevant ethnic 
categories as defined in EPR, “in the name of which an armed organization instigated the 
conflict.”172 In this thesis, their coding of ethnic wars was matched with the PRIO data 
using unique identifiers of conflicts. 173 This process is documented in Appendix A.  
The list of ethnic groups from GREG was matched with the names of ethnic 
groups used in EPR, and then matched with PRIO BD data. In some cases, several ethnic 
categories of the GREG dataset were aggregated into one ethnic category used in EPR. 
The process of matching GREG to EPR is documented in Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
170Julian Wucherpfennig, Nils B. Weidmann, Lars-Erik Cederman, Luc Girardin, Philippe Duhart, 
Gustav Brown, James Flora, Andreas Wimmer, "GeoEPR dataset,” http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14206 
(accessed October 22, 2010). 
171 Julian Wucherpfennig, Nils B. Weidmann, Lars-Erik Cederman, Luc Girardin, Philippe Duhart, 
Gustav Brown, James Flora, Andreas Wimmer, "GeoEPR dataset,” http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14206 
(accessed October 22, 2010); ,Wucherpfennig, J., Weidmann, N. B., Girardin, L., Cederman, L.-E. and 
Wimmer, A., “Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the GeoEPR 
Dataset,” forthcoming in the Journal of Conflict Management and Peace Science. 
172 Cederman, Wimmer and Min, Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis, 87. 
173 Lars-Erik Cederman; Brian Min; Andreas Wimmer, "Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset,” 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11797 (accessed October 22, 2010); Wimmer, Cederman and Min, Ethnic 
Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set, 316; Cederman, 
Wimmer and Min, Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis, 87. 
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From GeoEPR and GREG, subsets of settlements were chosen that included only 
ethnic groups that participated in conflicts; data on all other groups was dropped. Finally, 
this thesis employed the CIESIN GPW dataset174 to obtain population estimates for each 
polygon in the subsets. The CIESIN GPW dataset consists of raster map data, where each 
cell represents the area of 2.5'x2.5' (approximately 5x5 km at the equator). A cell’s value 
indicates the number of people that live in the corresponding area. Using the ArcGIS 
software, the values of the cells within each polygon were summed to obtain the 
population estimates for the areas populated by particular ethnic groups. The earliest 
population figures are available for 1990. Again, these population estimates present 
endogeneity problems because even if the number of battle deaths in conflict were low 
compared to overall country population (several thousand or tens of thousands), overall 
number of deaths (including one-sided and communal violence), as well as refugee and 
internally displaced persons (IDP) flows, will have a especially significant impact on 
population figures in cells plagued with conflicts. But to drop all the cases prior to 1990 
would irreparably decrease the sample. To alleviate the endogeneity problem, the 
regressions with the data on areal and population distribution will be done separately.  
The procedures described above resulted in two datasets containing records of 
polygons for each ethnic group, with indicated area and population estimates for each 
polygon, and an indication of a group’s participation in specific conflicts with estimates 
of the battle deaths. Ideally, it would be best to obtain settlement polygons and population 
estimates relevant to the time period immediately before the outbreak of civil war, but, 
unfortunately, data employed in the analysis here is the best that has been found. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN  
As was mentioned earlier, the statistical analysis in this thesis was conducted on 
two independent tests of ethnic settlement data that was based on two different geospatial 
datasets: GeoEPR and GREG. Within both datasets, there were separately tested 
measures related to regional and local intermingling. These measures were subdivided 
                                                 
174 The procedure on how to extract values for population estimates is illustrated in Weidmann, Rød 
and Cederman, Representing Ethnic Groups in Space: A New Dataset, 491–499. 
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into territory and population estimates for regional and local intermingling. All the tests 
were conducted on all of the available samples and on episodes that occurred after 1964 
to control for the endogeneity of data contained in the original datasets). The division of 
variables is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   The Variables and the Universe of Cases 
GeoEPR GREG 
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To test the hypothesis H1b (regional intermingling), this thesis will measure the 
relative sizes of ethnic settlement clusters separated from the rest of the kin population. 
For the simple measures of areal and population concentration, this thesis adopts a 
procedure described by Weidmann175 and based on the Herfindahl concentration formula, 
which operates with the proportions of total territory or population. If ti is a polygon of a 




                                                 




where a(ti) is the proportion of the total group’s area that belongs to polygon ti; and 
Population concentration =
 
where p(ti) is the proportion of the total group’s population that belongs to polygon ti.  
 
Since the proportions of territory (both area and population wise) are represented 
in fractions of 1, a group that consists of a greater amount of separated clusters will have 
a lower concentration measure. It is expected that in a statistical analysis these 
coefficients will have negative values, as with the decreasing value of concentration, the 
likelihood of greater intensity of conflict increases.   
To measure the effect of local intermingling on conflict intensity (hypothesis 
H1a), this study will employ the proportion of the territory that is inhabited by 
representatives of different ethnicities together with the ethnic group in conflict. It is 
known that the larger the proportion of cohabited territory, the greater the likelihood of 
higher casualties in the corresponding conflict. Thus, the coefficient is expected to have a 






Proportion of cohabited area =  
 
where ac(ti) is the proportion of the total group’s area that belongs to polygon ti, which is 
cohabited by the group in conflict together with other groups; and 
Proportion of cohabited population =
 
where pc(ti) is the proportion of the total group’s population that belongs to polygon ti, 
which is cohabited by the group in conflict with other groups. 
The variables that were calculated separately for GeoEPR and GREG datasets are 
summarized in Table 3: 
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for Variables on Settlement Patterns 
Variable name STATA variable name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expected 
effect 
Intensity intensity 102 10.49792 15.39128 .0571429 68.25938 n/a 
Areal concentration geoeprea2 102 .7926554 .2412424 .0841359 1 negative 
Population 
concentration 
geoeprep2 102 .7944737 .2468744 .0751526 1 negative 
Proportion of cohabited 
area 
geoeprpracohab 102 .626924 .4522246 0 1 positive 
Proportion of cohabited 
population 
geoeprprpcohab 102 .6344046 .4443358 0 1 positive 
Areal concentration gregea2 75 .8183941 .2352596 .0778093 1 negative 
Population 
concentration 
gregep2 75 .8219298 .2362144 .0705474 1 negative 
Proportion of cohabited 
area 
gregpracohab 75 .0677583 .1191229 0 .4878194 positive 
Proportion of cohabited 
population 
gregprpcohab 75 .1024427 .1581872 0 .6381506 positive 
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In order to control for the impact of other factors on conflict intensity, the 
statistical tests will include additional variables from EPR and PRIO datasets, as well as 
statistical data from Lacina’s tests.176 As mentioned in Chapter IV, other factors that have 
impact on conflict intensity include availability of arms supplies and other external 
support, geography, size and strength of major actors, level of democracy, degrees of 
polarization, horizontal inequality and exclusion from political power, type of conflict 
and incompatibility, and peacekeeping efforts. 
To control for the availability of arms supplies and other external support, this 
study will use Lacina’s cold war dummy, which divides conflict into those that started 
prior to 1989 (when the assistance from major powers was more easily accessible both to 
states and rebels), and after that date. Of course, this measure is only a crude 
approximation of the availability of external support. The tests will also include Lacina’s 
measure of proportion of mountainous terrain in overall country’s territory as a proxy for 
the impact of geography on the intensity of conflict. To measure a country’s economic 
and military capabilities, this thesis will use Lacina’s logged measure of GDP (as a proxy 
for economic performance and strength) and the military quality coefficient, defined as 
amount of military expenditures divided by the number of military personnel. The ethnic 
rebels’ strength, which generally derives from their population base, will be proxied by 
the EPR’s measure of the ethnic group’s relative size. In order to control for the possible 
impact on conflict of democratic institutions and processes, this study will use Lacina’s 
democracy dummy, which codes democratic and non-democratic regimes. The degree of 
polarization can be captured by the EPR’s measure of political status of ethnic groups in 
respective societies. The analysis will also include the PRIO’s variable on the type of 
incompatibility that is being fought over (territory or government), and type of the ethnic 
group’s settlement (GeoEPR). The test of the impact of peacekeeping operations was not 
performed due to the likelihood of its endogeneity in relation to conflict intensity. The 
 
                                                 
176 Lacina, Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars, 276–289. The coding of variables is provided in 
Appendix C. We disregard the variables related to ethnic diversity, since our sample of conflicts is limited 
to exactly such civil wars. We also exclude the variables related to duration of conflict (Duration and 
lnDuration), since our measure of conflict intensity already includes the factor of time. 
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variables from PRIO, EPR and GeoEPR have not been previously tested in models 
designed to explain conflict intensity, so their overall performance presents additional 
interest.  
The inclusion of variables from external sources presents further challenges to 
this analysis. For the inclusion of Lacina’s data reduced the sample to 53 cases. In 
addition, some of the parameters are country level data, not the disaggregated actor-level 
data. They were accepted only because better measures were not available. Table 4 
provides general description of the variables. 
Table 4.   Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
statuscode 102 2.77451 1.597689 1 6 
settletype 102 1.862745 1.235123 1 6 
size 102 .1742549 .2233211 .001 .98 
incomp 102 1.362745 .4831664 1 2 
cw 53 .6226415 .4893644 0 1 
democ 53 .2075472 .4094316 0 1 
milqual 53 6195.828 8682.993 189.8268 40837.31 
size 102 .1742549 .2233211 .001 .98 
incomp 102 1.362745 .4831664 1 2 
 
D. DISCUSSION OF REGRESSION RESULTS 
The statistical tests are based on the OLS regression and have been conducted 
using the STATA177 package. Prior to testing the variables on settlement patterns, this 
study separately regressed the models that incorporated all other variables, including 
Lacina’s data that reduced the sample to 53 observations, and the model that included 
only EPR/PRIO variables (which do not limit the sample).178  
                                                 
177 STATA, http://www.stata.com 
178 Detailed results are reported in Appendix D.  
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Table 5.   Regression Results for Models Excluding Settlement Data 



















cw  1.238 (5.094) 
3.843 
(4.933)  





lngdp  -1.335 (1.049) 
-1.489 
(1.022)  
milqual  -.00017 (.00027) 
-.0002 
(.0002)  











observations 102 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.0715 0.1814 0.3530 0.2729 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0332 0.0943 0.2175 0.2439 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
When tested separately, the EPR/PRIO and Lacina’s sets of variables have little 
predictive power, with low pseudo R2 values. The third model includes data from both 
datasets. The variables that code state regime and political status of the respective ethnic 
group are consistently statistically significant. The adjusted R2 in the third model is 
relatively high (0.2175) compared to other models that will be tested further, and the 
variables are even more significant (p=0.003) in the fourth model that includes only these 
two factors, with the pseudo R2 even higher—0.2439.  
The direction of the influence of these two variables is especially interesting. As 
could have been predicted, the democracy coefficient has negative sign—that is, regimes 
that are more democratic face lower risk of severe casualties in ethnic civil wars. At the 
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same time, the statuscode variable has positive sign. The value of this variable increases 
for ethnic groups that enjoy higher status in respective societies and more political rights 
in the corresponding polity. Thus, groups that have had higher standing in less 
democratic societies are associated with greater intensity of violence. What may explain 
such connection? Perhaps, for groups that have enjoyed higher status in undemocratic 
states, the stakes in the conflict are higher (e.g., they view conflict as a zero-sum game), 
or they have better access to military resources. At the same time, the statistical 
significance of these two particular variables may be attributed to possible difference in 
scope and completeness of reporting on conflicts involving high profile and marginal 
groups in undemocratic societies. In any case, this finding deserves further scrutiny in 
separate research.  
The following Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the statistical tests of the ethnic 
settlement variables for GeoEPR and GREG. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The models are testing separately variables estimating population and area. In addition, it 
has been decided not to test the H1a and H1b variables in one model due to their possible 
collinearity, which is especially dangerous due to small sample of available observations.  
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Table 6.   Regression Results for Variables Based on GeoEPR 
Testing 
hypothesis H1a (local intermingling) H1b (regional intermingling) 
Using data on Area Population Area Population 
Including cases All After 1964 All After 1964 All After 1964 All After 1964 
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observations 53 102 41 80 53 102 41 80 53 102 41 80 53 102 41 80 
R-squared 0.3600 0.0811 0.3663 0.0702 0.3553 0.0805 0.3563 0.0692 0.3542 0.0905 0.3433 0.0850 0.3531 0.0803 0.3433 0.0727 
Adjusted R2  0.2076 0.0332 0.1551 0.0073 0.2019 0.0326 0.1417 0.0063 0.2005 0.0432 0.1244 0.0231 0.1991 0.0324 0.1244 0.0101 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 7.   Regression Results for Variables Based on GREG 
Testing hypothesis H1a (local intermingling) H1b (regional intermingling) 
Using data on Area Population Area Population 
Including cases All After 1964 All After 1964 All After 1964 All After 1964 
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observations 35 75 25 56 35 75 25 56 35 75 25 56 35 75 25 56 
R-squared 0.4402 0.2341 0.3785 0.1917 0.4410 0.2275 0.3812 0.1937 0.4342 0.2357 0.4832 0.1964 0.4330 0.2343 0.4282 0.2027 
Adjusted R2 0.2070 0.1786 -0.0654 0.1108 0.2080 0.1715 -0.0607 0.1131 0.1985 0.1803 0.1140 0.1160 0.1967 0.1788 0.0197 0.1230 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Out of 32 regression models, the coefficients related to ethnic settlements have 
yielded no statistically significant results. Due to limitations of available datasets, tests of 
some models include data from only 25 observations out of 102, and thus their results can 
hardly be accepted as reliable. Their adjusted R-squared measures are very low. In both 
datasets, the highest pseudo R2 is 0.2080, which is worse than the model that does not 
include the settlement data at all. The GREG models have on average better values of the 
adjusted R2 than the models in GeoEPR.  
At the same time, among the variables borrowed from other sources, some factors 
have significant influence on conflict intensity. In GeoEPR, statuscode and democracy 
measures remain significant. The models that are not limited to conflicts after 1964, have 
significant negative impact of democracy on the intensity, and largest adjusted R2 values. 
The implications of these findings have already been discussed earlier.  
In the GREG regressions, statuscode variable remains significant with positive 
sign, while Lacina’s variables have little predictive power. The democracy variable, 
which is consistently significant in GeoEPR, is important only in two models based on 
the GREG data.  
In addition, in the shorter models that include EPR/PRIO data, the settlement type 
and incompatibility type variables become important. The settlement type variable has 
positive sign, which means that the risk of more violent conflict increases for regional-
urban groups, even more so for dispersed and aggregated groups. Incompatibility also has 
positive sign, which means that conflicts over issues related to government are more 
deadly than conflicts over territory only (separatism). It is interesting that these variables 
are significant only together with GREG data. These models have relatively high adjusted 
R2 among all other models. Overall, EPR/PRIO data performs better with GREG than 
when tested separately. However, the pseudo-R2 values in these models remain very low, 
ranging from 0.11 to 0.18 in GREG, and become even lower in GeoEPR.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the statistical tests did not provide definitive results that would 
allow confirming or rejecting the hypotheses regarding ethnic settlement patterns and the 
intensity of violence in ethnic civil wars. It is not entirely clear whether poor results point 
to the non-relationship between the settlement patterns and the intensity of violence, or 
the deficiencies of existing data did not allow capturing that relationship. The available 
data at best could have captured only strategic-level features of the settlements, while the 
violence is always committed locally.  
First, further research and data collection efforts are needed to obtain better and 
more fine-grained data on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. The intensity measure could 
include not only the estimates on battle related deaths, but other negative impacts of civil 
wars. Even the data on battle deaths may not be accurately collected because the host 
nation or independent sources may not report such data. Additionally, there are instances 
where it is virtually impossible to accurately codify casualties as either battle deaths, 
communal or one-sided violence.  
Second, the data on settlement patterns used in the analysis is also lacking 
accuracy and satisfactory granularity, as it has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
approximation of ethnic boundaries and the simplification of the ethnic composition of 
particular regions may actually miss the exact factors that have an impact on conflict 
intensity—contested neighborhoods and the possible victims of inter-ethnic violence. 
Better measures of ethnic regional concentration and local cohabitation would arguably 
include village level data, cover entire globe, and be relevant to the time prior to the onset 
of hostilities.  
Collection of such data presents its own challenges because the process may 
quickly become politicized, especially in conflict torn societies with high levels of 
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mistrust between groups, and even lead to the instigation of conflict.179 Also, such 
systematic data may be used by political rivals to facilitate targeting opponents. As the 
ethnic conflicts continue to take human lives, there is an acute need to create more 






                                                 
179 For  example, consider the Illinden uprising in the Macedonia in 1903. The census organized by 
Ottoman Empire led to competition between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia for forceful identification of local 
population as belonging to corresponding ethnicities, often contrary to the population’s own desires 
(I. Yosmaoglu, "Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in Ottoman 
Macedonia," International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): 55). 
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VI. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter offers the analysis of four ethnic civil wars and uses this analysis to 
determine the causes of varying intensity of recorded violence in these conflicts. The two 
civil wars being analyzed that have low estimates of battle deaths are the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT) conflict in Bangladesh (1975–1997) and the Slovenian war for 
independence (1991). The two contrasting cases are the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgency 
(1984–2009) and the Bosnian civil war (1992–1995). The case studies will follow the 
method of structured comparison180 to investigate the possible mechanisms that link 
particular configurations of ethnic settlements to more (or less) violent conflicts. The unit 
of analysis here is the ethnic civil war. The analysis will focus on five categories of 
evidence, as described in Chapter IV. These categories include indicators related to the 
central actors, the perpetrators, the victims, the environment, and the endogenous 
processes of civil conflicts. 
The selection of cases was guided by the attempt to demonstrate sufficient 
variance of the dependent variable (taking into account both intensity and total number of 
battle deaths), while, at the same time, control for as many external factors as possible. 
All four cases represent conflicts that have ended or are not currently active. The cases 
were selected to cover different parts of the world, but preserve similarity within the 
dyads that are compared—the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the Sri Lankan Tamils, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia.  
One of these similarities includes the fact that both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are 
former British colonies that received their independence from the metropole almost 
simultaneously (although Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan until 1971). Most of the 
terrain where these conflicts occurred is covered with hills and jungles or scrub forest, 
with marine access (Sri Lanka) or close proximity to the sea (CHT) and waterways. 
Neither conflict resulted in the creation of new states. In both cases, certain subgroups 
                                                 
180 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67. 
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within the insurgency chose to cooperate with the government prior to the breakdown of 
the uprising. The conflicts for both groups were instances where the insurgents initially 
were fighting for the recognition (or restoration) of their political rights and preservation 
of cultural identity. Their demands eventually escalated to separatism, but the groups 
were defeated militarily and compelled to renounce (at least formally) their separatist 
goals. The level of economic development of the two countries in the first pair of cases is 
different—overpopulated and agrarian Bangladesh remains extremely poor, while Sri 
Lanka demonstrated steady growth of GDP even during the civil war.  
The Bosnia and Herzegovina/Slovenia pair of cases also has many similarities. 
Both Balkan countries were members of Yugoslavia and thus shared many cultural and 
social features. Bosnia and Slovenia have quite similar geographic conditions, consisting 
primarily of mountainous terrain. The armed conflicts had clear separatist causes, and 
resulted in the creation of two new, independent states. In both cases, the conventional 
operations on the government side were largely conducted by the same forces—the 
Yugoslavian National Army (JNA). Again, as in the previous pair of cases, the level of 
economic development in the last two countries was markedly different even before the 
independence. Slovenia was the most developed part of the Yugoslavia, while Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were one of the most backward regions. It is noteworthy that the level of 
economic development in the dyads is associated with diametrically opposed outcomes of 
conflicts in terms of human cost: low economic development in Bosnia and high death 
tolls, and low economic development and low death tolls in Bangladesh. 
Another important challenge for this analysis was selecting cases with a relatively 
similar amount of available information. It would be difficult to compare a large scale 
insurgency with a low profile case because the amount and quality of available data for 
each case would be different. There is always the risk that even the news media will tend 
to “over-report” on a more conspicuous civil war and “under-report” on a small-scale 
insurgency in remote areas, especially if the regime that is challenged by the insurgency 
is not transparent. The Bosnian and Slovenian cases are well documented, while the Sri 
Lankan government, at different points in the course of the conflict, attempted to limit 
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access of reporters to conflict zones and affected population. The Bangladesh case is the 
least familiar, and the government is alleged to have deliberately withheld information 
about the conflict. 
Each case study will proceed in the following way: After outlining general 
information about the country and the conflict, the attention will be focused on the case-
specific factors that explain the different intensity of violence in the conflict and their 
relationship to the hypotheses and mechanisms presented in this thesis. The third section 
in each case study will highlight the five classes of indicators that reveal additional 
information about the relationship between the ethnic settlements and intensity of civil 
wars. 
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A. CASE STUDY 1: THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS 
Table 8.   Country and Conflict Information 
General Country Information 181 
Total area: 143,998 sq km (94th largest in the world) 
Total population: 156,118,464 (July 2010 est., 7th largest in the world) 
Ethnic composition: Bengali 98%, other 2% (1998). According to the 1981 
census, the thirteen indigenous tribes living in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) comprised approximately 
900,000 persons. 
General Conflict Information182 
Conflict name: Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) 
Date of first stated goals of 
incompatibility: 
7 March, 1972 
Date when conflict reached 
25 battle-related deaths: 
1 February, 1975 
Conflict status: Terminated: 5 November, 1992 
Duration of hostilities 
(days): 
6488 
Total recorded battle 
deaths: 
1152 
1. Conflict Summary  
The Chittagong Hill Tracts comprise the upland and are the least densely 
populated area in Bangladesh. It is the home of as many as thirteen diverse indigenous 
tribes. Until the 1960s, they enjoyed autonomous and protected status granted by the 
British colonial authority that made migration to the area virtually impossible.183  
                                                 
181 The Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA—the World Factbook," 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (accessed December 4, 2010). 
182Uppsala Universitet, UCDP Database, Uppsala Universitet, 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php (accessed October 22, 2010); UCDP PRIO Battle Deaths 
dataset, http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/ (accessed October 22, 2010).  
183 Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, "Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts," Asian Survey 29, no. 10 (1989): 963. 
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In 1963, Pakistan’s constitutional amendment abolished the area’s autonomy. 
This move coincided with the completion of the Kaptai dam, which inundated up to 40% 
of cultivable land in the CHT, affecting about 100,000 persons.184 In 1972, the new 
constitution of independent Bangladesh confirmed the abolition of the autonomous status 
and further opened the area for economic development and new settlers, causing gradual 
marginalization of the indigenous people. 
Even before the Bangladesh constitution was formally adopted, the 
representatives of the tribes explicitly demanded restoration of their status, but the 
Bangladesh central government rejected their requests.185 Despite cultural diversity, the 
tribes stood together to protect their rights against outside interference, forming the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Coordination Association/Peace Force (“Parbattya 
Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti/Shanti Bahini,” or PCJSS/SB). The Shanti Bahini (SB) 
became the major armed wing of the organization up until it was disbanded in 1997. The 
warfare was largely conducted in the CHT area. PCJSS/SB included several smaller 
factions, which had differing views regarding the conflict with the government. The 
indigenous tribes, in fact, represented the proto-ethnic group, which in the course of the 
struggle acquired a new common identity and started referring to themselves collectively 
as jumma.186 The conflict has been virtually inactive since 1992, and on December 2, 
1997 the sides officially signed the Peace Accords that recognized certain rights and 
privileges of the indigenous people and stopped (at least on paper) the migration of 
Bengalis into the region.  
2. The Major Factors Explaining Conflict Intensity  
The conflict demonstrated low intensity of fighting—0.18 daily battle deaths, with 
the total number of battle-related deaths equally 1152 (Figure 3). However, some scholars 
questioned the accuracy of these reported numbers:  
                                                 
184 Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, "Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts," Asian Survey 29, no. 10 (1989), 964. 
185Uppsala Universitet, UCDP Database. 
186 Mark Levene, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Case Study in the Political Economy of 'Creeping' 
Genocide," Third World Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1999): 339–369. 
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Information on the Jummas and the conflict in the CHTs is frequently 
censored by government officials on the ground of ‘national security.’ The 
picture is further obscured by what could arguably be described as self-
censorship by some of the Bangladeshi media and human rights groups.187 
 
Figure 3.   The Intensity of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Conflict by Year 
Alternative sources give the casualty estimates for the conflict to be as large as 
25,000188 or 125,000 fatalities since 1947.189 In any case, the entire humanitarian impact 
of the conflict was much more substantial. The number of tribal refugees in the 
neighboring Indian Tripura reached 75,000 in the early 1990s. 190 Both sides are reported 
to have committed mass atrocities against unarmed populations, which are not taken into 
account as battle-related deaths.  
                                                 
187 Minority Rights Group, War: The Impact on Minority and Indigenous Children (London: MRG, 
1997), 9. Additionally, other authors make the same point: Ahsan and Chakma, Problems of National 
Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts, 959–970; Nazmul Hasan Chowdhury, "The 
Resistance Movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Global and Regional Connections," Asian Affairs 28, 
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Prior to the conflict, the settlement pattern of the indigenous tribes was comprised 
of a single polygon with insignificant local intermingling (that is if the group of 
indigenous tribes is described as homogeneous (Figure 4)). The movement of Bengali 
settlers into the CHT area became one of the major causes for the indigenous 
population’s decison to take up arms. Interestingly, the major shifts in population 
settlements occurred during the conflict. In 1951, the Bengali population in the CHT 
comprised 9% of the total population. In 1961, that number jumped to 12%, and in 1981 
(after the beginning of the civil war) Bengalis comprised 40%191 of the population. 
                                                 




Figure 4.   The Ethnic Settlements of Indigenous Tribes in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts192 
                                                 
192 Map created using ESRI ArcGIS software. http://www.esri.com/ 
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By these standards, if the hypotheses posited in this thesis are correct, the 
intensity of violence should have been higher, as the indigenous population and the 
settlers were increasingly drawn into closer contact. However, certain intervening factors 
prevented significant escalation of hostilities. These factors include: 
1. The strategy of the population separation. The government program of 
Bengali relocation into the CHT was conducted under direct supervision and strong 
protection from the military. All settlements were built close to one of several hundreds 
of military installations in the area. Additionally, as the clashes between the local 
population and the settlers intensified, the government initiated the relocation of the 
tribes into centralized villages (also guarded by the military) to destroy the scattered 
pattern of their dwellings.193 Thus, neither settlers nor indigenous people represented an 
easily targeted, locally intermingled population that would trigger the mechanisms 
outlined earlier in this thesis. 
2. The concentrated Bangladeshi military presence in the area and huge 
disparity in military strength and manpower between the parties.194 The CHT tribes 
comprised only approximately one percent of the total population of Bangladesh, while 
they inhabited approximately 10% of the country’s territory. During the conflict, about 
one-third of the Bangladeshi army was deployed in the area to fight the insurgency. Its 
total numbers, together with the paramilitaries, reached 90,000–115,000 troops so that 
there was “almost one soldier for every five or six tribals.”195 The estimates of the SB’s 
strength were about 5,000196 to 15,000197 troops.  
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3. Indiscriminate retaliatory tactics used by the military. The entire 
indigenous population was viewed as “guilty” for the insurgent activities. “After every 
clash the military carried out ruthless oppression on unarmed villagers,”198 causing 
increasing flows of refugees to the India’s territory.199 As predicted by the mechanisms, 
local Bengali militias and paramilitaries were instrumental in carrying out massacres and 
pogroms in the indigenous villages. There were also numerous reports of atrocities 
against the insurgents committed by regular units during combing operations.200 
However, as mentioned earlier, these attacks on the unarmed civilian population are not 
counted in the conflict intensity.  
4. The disagreement among the insurgency leaders regarding their strategic 
goals in the conflict. The tribal resistance did not represent a unified front.201 Among the 
smaller tribes, there was fear of the large Chakma tribe dominance.202 What is even more 
important is that the leadership of the SB was divided between proponents of more 
violent confrontation (the Priti Kumar faction) and the moderates (led by Manobendra 
Larma) arguing for the “long protracted form of armed struggle to achieve autonomy 
within Bangladesh, not secede from it.”203 The major point of disagreement between the 
two factions was whether attacks on Bengali settlers were justified. After Priti’s followers 
killed Larma, Manobendra’s brother led the resistance and continued to follow Larma’s 
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growth and protracted struggle. At the same time, the SB never entirely withheld from 
negotiating with the central authorities,204 which may also explain the low intensity of 
fighting. 
a. Indicators Related to Central Actors 
The Bangladesh’s government policy of settling the CHT did not directly 
include the goal for the physical elimination of the indigenous tribes, only of their 
assimilation.205 In 1972, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister Mujib “advised the […] tribal 
leaders to forget their ethnic identities and merge with greater “Bengali” nationalism.”206 
As mentioned earlier, the major insurgency leaders did not encourage 
unrestrained targeting of Bengali settlers. The tribal leaders continued to work with the 
government system as much as against it,207 and continued to identify with the 
Bangladesh state. As M.N. Larma mentioned, “you cannot impose your national identity 
on others. I am a Chakma, not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh—Bangladeshi. 
You are also Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali. … They (tribals) can 
never be Bengali.”208  
b. Indicators Related to Perpetrators 
Due to immense military presence, the perpetrators on the government 
side were mostly regular military or security forces. It is difficult to assess the ratio of 
regular to irregular forces; however, in the instances of mass violence against civilians, 
irregulars were acting together with the regular forces:  
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Following the killings of non-tribal people by the Shanti Bahini in April 
1986, reprisals had taken place against the tribal people. […] The security 
forces had been unprepared for the sudden escalation of violence that 
occurred, and were unable to contain the strong emotions aroused at the 
time. […] It was acknowledged that elements of the security forces – for 
example junior personnel of the paramilitary or volunteer units – may 
have assisted in the reprisals in so far as they provided active support to 
the actions of the non-tribal people.   
This account also exemplifies the extent to which the central authorities sanctioned or 
controlled the violent actions of the immediate perpetrators.  
The insurgents were organized within the Maoist tradition into clandestine 
regional networks, and enjoyed a high degree of local support. The SB had limited access 
to arms and external assistance. It is claimed that India may have provided logistics and 
training for the rebels, and they may have had camps on the Indian and Burmese 
territories. 
c. Indicators Related to Victims 
The victims of government actions included large numbers of the peaceful 
population. While exact figures are missing, the number of refugees that fled the area 
indicates that indiscriminate coercive methods were used liberally.  
Initially, the SB attacked only military targets, but later started targeting 
Bengali settlers as well. However, as the local population on both sides became 
increasing victimized, the government made extensive efforts to physically separate the 
tribesmen and the settlers. 
d. Indicators Related to Environment 
The CHT area was sparsely populated. This fact, along with the 
inaccessibility of terrain, represented certain advantages for the low-intensity Maoist type 




roads) allowed the military to control the area more effectively. The proximity of 
international borders allowed large numbers of the indigenous population to escape 
violence. 
e. Indicators Related to Endogenous Processes of Civil War 
The conflict experienced gradual escalation which culminated in 1980, 
when 17,000 villagers crossed the Tripura border, and then in 1986, when the inter-
communal riots saturated the area. Interestingly, these escalations are not in any way 
reflected on the graph of annual battle deaths (Figure 3). Unfortunately, this absence of 
information needs further inquiry that is outside the scope of this thesis. These escalations 
resulted in the government launching the resettlement programs for the tribal groups in an 
attempt to uproot the insurgency. In general, the conflict did not experience periods of 
intense escalation of combat activity. The insurgents controlled the rural areas, but were 
unable to launch effective attacks because of a disparity in strength and because it 
immediately exposed villagers to reprisals. 
3. Conclusion 
The first case study demonstrated, the opportunity and organizational mechanisms 
outlined in Chapter IV are not profound in this conflict, despite the increasingly favorable 
conditions for the mechanisms to manifest themselves. It is explained by several reasons. 
The Bangladeshi armed forces had an overwhelming military and numerical advantage 
over the insurgents. Due to the army’s effective protection of settlers and indiscriminate 
retaliatory tactics, the insurgents could not mount an effective resistance or attack “soft” 
targets. At the same time, the proximity of the Bangladesh border with India allowed 
many tribe members to escape the violence. The insurgent’s leadership made a strategic 
choice to fight for recognition within the Bangladesh state and not for the outright 
separation, while the government’s major goals were assimilation, not elimination, of 




intermingling of Bengali settlers and indigenous tribes, along with the demilitarization of 
the CHT territories increases the risk that if the conflict escalates to a civil war in the 
future, the amount of violence (in any of its forms) will be significant.  
B. CASE STUDY 2: THE SRI LANKAN TAMILS 
Table 9.   Country and Conflict Information 
General Country Information209  
Total area: 65,610 sq km (121th largest in the world) 
Total population: 21,513,990 (July 2010 est., 55th largest in the world) 
Ethnic composition: Sinhalese 73.8%, Sri Lankan Moors 7.2%, Indian Tamil 
4.6%, Sri Lankan Tamil 3.9%, other 0.5%, unspecified 10% 
(2001 census provisional data) 
General Conflict Information210  
Conflict name: Sri Lanka (Eelam) 
Date of first stated goals 
of incompatibility: 
14 May, 1976 
Date when conflict 
reached 25 battle-related 
deaths: 
10 September, 1984 
Conflict status: Terminated: 19 May, 2009 
Duration of hostilities 
(days): 
7633 
Total recorded battle 
deaths: 
76807* 
* This number includes the battle death estimates only for the years 1984 through 2008. 
1. Conflict Summary  
After Sri Lanka received independence from Great Britain in 1948, the island 
witnessed steady growth of nationalism that blended the ideas of Sinhalese supremacy 
and Buddhist religiousness into increasingly violent ideology, and eventually became a 
major source of concern for local ethnic minorities, essentially triggering separatist 
sentiments among Tamils.211 The two ethnicities coexisted more or less peacefully until 
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the twentieth century,212 when the Sinhalese religious nationalism and Tamil separatism 
had galvanized Sri Lanka and segmented the society into ethno-religious groups that for 
decades fought a bitter and increasingly bloody civil war. The Tamil minority interpreted 
changes to the constitution in 1971, and later consolidation of presidential power, as a 
threat to their interests. In turn, Tamil protests were interpreted by Sinhalese as a threat 
from a much larger ethnic community that included Tamils in India.213 Spirals of public 
unrest, violent attacks and inter-communal violence culminated in 1983’s Black July, 
which marked the “official” start of the Tamil separatist campaign.214 The Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became the major insurgent organization that challenged 
Sri Lankan authority and violently eliminated any rivals to its claim of being the 
exclusive representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils.  
The insurgency underwent several phases of intensified fighting. Despite 
numerous attempts to negotiate a cease-fire, the hostilities hardy ever stopped. Large 
portions of the island in the East and North were under insurgents’ control, where they 
established courts and security apparatuses, and collected taxes. The critical source of 
funding for the insurgency had been the large Tamil Diaspora that emerged in North 
America and Western Europe after the ethnic violence erupted on the island in the mid-
1980s. The counter-terrorist financing efforts taken on the international level after 2001 
had an adverse effect on the availability of support for the organization. By 2009, the 
government forces managed to exhaust the LTTE and finally defeated the rebel 
organization militarily. 
2. The Major Factors Explaining Conflict Intensity  
Unlike the CHT conflict, international media had more access to the information 
about the conflict, despite the fact that at certain points the Sri Lankan government tried 
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to limit such access. The recorded intensity of violence in the Tamil civil war was 10.06 
daily battle deaths (excluding the endgame of the conflict in 2009), with an enormous 
total death toll estimated at 76,807 lives (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.   The Intensity of the Sri Lankan Tamil Conflict by Year  
The final stage of the civil war in May 2009 was extremely bloody. According to 
the UCDP,  
On 15 May, the UN estimated that about 7000 civilians had been killed in 
the fighting between 20 January and 7 May. The Times claimed on 30 
May that according to unreleased UN documents, the figure had risen to 
20 000 by 19 May. According to The Times, 13 000 of these had been 
killed in May alone. […] Throughout the period of fighting in 2009, the 
government banned all journalists from the conflict zone and only allowed 
ICRC to work in the area. UN and other aid agencies were eventually 
given restricted access to the government camps for displaced Tamils, 
which came to hold up to 280 000 civilians.215 
According to the GeoEPR and GREG, the settlement patterns of the two ethnic groups 
comprised numerous islands of heterogeneous population. Substantial local and regional 
intermingling can be observed on the Sri Lankan ethnic map (Figure 6). The question 
then arises, what effect (if any) did ethnic settlement patterns have on the conflict 
intensity? 
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Figure 6.   The Ethnic Settlements of Tamils in Sri Lanka 216 
                                                 
216 Map created using ESRI ArcGIS software. http://www.esri.com/ 
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A large portion of LTTE’s operations had a more conventional and organized, 
rather than irregular and decentralized, character. There is no accurate measure of the 
proportion of attacks that involved small enclaves of population versus those that were 
conducted against the larger pockets of ethnic kin (thus, it is difficult to determine 
whether the mechanisms that have been specified in this thesis are at work). However, it 
is definite that the intermingled character of ethnic settlements had a profound impact on 
the overall dynamics of the conflict. 
First, the conventional strength of LTTE (and its ability to inflict and sustain 
casualties) derived from the donations of the large and wealthy Tamil Diaspora living in 
the West.217 The availability of funding and support allowed LTTE to invest heavily in 
the smuggling of arms, the training of its troops, discipline, and its command and control 
function, as well as its ability to recover quickly after major confrontations with the 
government. The Diaspora emerged as a direct result of ethnic cleansing and 
indiscriminate violence against the Tamils in areas of ethnic cohabitation in the early 
years of the conflict in the 1970s and mid-1980s. The manner in which the Diaspora 
formed suggests a high level of motivation to assist in confronting the Sinhalese 
nationalist agenda. Therefore, it may be argued that because of the intermingled character 
of ethnic settlements of the Sinhala and Tamils, the interethnic conflict resulted in a large 
exodus of the Tamil population, which later became a major contribution to the military 
strength of the insurgency, and increased intensity of violence in this civil war. 
Second, the insurgent control was concentrated in the Eastern and Northern parts 
of the island, where the Tamil population was in majority. Although the insurgents 
controlled large portions of the territory, this control has never been too firm. The Sri 
Lankan Army (SLA) frequently regained control of different parts of the island under 
insurgent control. The territories that fell under Tamil control were ethnically cleansed of 
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Sinhala and Muslims.218 The SLA, in its turn, detained large numbers of Tamils alleged 
in siding with the insurgency in the IDP camps,219 where numerous human rights 
violations have been recorded.  
Third, local insurgent commanders did not always follow orders and violent 
clashes between the factions within the insurgent organization were frequent. One of the 
most well known examples is the 2004 Karuna split that led to internecine fighting and 
confusion among insurgents that was aptly exploited by the government.220 However, it is 
unclear from the existing accounts about the insurgency whether the unstable connections 
between local areas under insurgent control impeded in ensuring firm discipline. 
In addition, numerous rival organizations had suffered from LTTE’s ambitions to 
be the sole voice of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The internal opposition or alternative 
movements with the Tamil community were ruthlessly wiped out. The violent reaction to 
any signs of dissent within its own ranks was also one of the characteristic features of the 
LTTE.  
Finally, there were many civilian casualties during the conventional operations. 
Both sides opened fire (including artillery bombardments) on residential areas during the 
battles.221 The LTTE is reported to have used human shields and kept the local population 
as hostages during their defensive operations. As mentioned earlier, the number of 
civilians caught in the cross-fire during the final stages of the war was especially high. 
However, it is difficult to establish whether the decision to use such tactics leading to 
substantial collateral damage was dictated or affected by the fact that probable casualties 
would largely include the representatives of the “ethnic enemy” population. 
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a. Indicators Related to Central Actors 
Sinhalese nationalism emphasized exclusive national identity and most of 
the riots and initial violence was directed at Tamils holding higher positions in the 
society, or living in urban areas where ethnicities were intermingled on a local scale. The 
Tamils’ demands progressed from recognition to separatism, focusing on areas in the 
East and North where the ethnicity constituted the majority.222 
The central command of the LTTE did not always exercise control over its 
forces despite its unusually high level of general discipline compared to other insurgent 
movements. The leadership on both sides of the confrontation defined the conflict in 
broad terms: the threat that the Tamils represented to the Sinhalese national identity was 
portrayed to include the Tamil Nadu, while the LTTE viewed radical Sinhalese 
nationalism as an irresolvable problem to their cultural distinctiveness.  
b. Indicators Related to Perpetrators 
Both the LTTE and Sinhalese nationalists made extensive use of violence 
against ethnic “others” and dissenting elements within their own ranks:  
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the formation of several armed 
separatist groups. Apart from LTTE, TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organisation) and EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation 
Front) are notable, but intense intra-factional fighting in the 1980s 
virtually destroyed the more inexperienced and undisciplined challengers 
to LTTE hegemony.223  
Even after the LTTE achieved the monopoly on “Tamil violence,” the organization 
continued to suffer from internal rivalries and the territorial commanders did not always 
follow orders.224  
The LTTE’s organization and the order of battle were similar to the 
conventional army, with its own naval forces, reconnaissance and engineer troops, etc. 
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The LTTE used a vast variety of conventional and irregular tactics, including hit-and-run 
attacks, IED explosions, abductions and assassinations, and large-scale offensives. The 
SLA’s tactics also included both conventional and counterinsurgency operations. 
Conventional operations were often conducted in areas with large and heterogeneous 
civilian populations, leading to significant collateral damage. Numerous war crimes were 
documented on both sides. The International Crisis Group reported allegations that the 
SLA was guilty of the intentional shelling of civilians, hospitals and humanitarian 
operations, while the LTTE was accused of intentional shooting and injuring of civilians 
who attempted to flee the conflict area.225  
c. Indicators Related to Victims 
The victims of battlefield operations included large numbers of civilians 
caught in cross fire. The victims of pogroms and inter-communal riots supplemented the 
casualties from the military operations in this conflict. Ultimately, the government was 
accused of ignoring the mass killings of civilian Tamil population.  
As it was mentioned earlier, the casualties of the conflict included many 
Sinhalese and Muslim victims of the LTTE’s ethnic cleansings in the Northern provinces. 
The victims of insurgents included the ethnic “others” and those considered traitors of the 
nationalist cause. It is also argued that the LTTE is actually guilty of killing more Tamils 
than the government.226  
d. Indicators Related to Environment 
Most of the territories where the clashes occurred belonged to ethnically 
heterogeneous areas, which arguably aggravated the violent effects of the insurgency. 
The Sri Lankan geography is comprised of mountainous and hilly terrain with scrub 
forest. This is where the LTTE built numerous defensive fortifications. However, it is 
unclear to what extent the terrain affected casualty figures in this case.  
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e. Indicators Related to Endogenous Processes of Civil War 
Despite the numerous attempts to achieve a negotiated solution, the peace 
talks were wrecked by continued uncontrolled violence. As stated in the UCDP dataset, 
“In the north the LTTE fought a largely conventional war against the armed forces, while 
it pursued a guerrilla insurgency strategy in the east, which was combined with a 
bombing campaign against political and economical targets in the south.”227 There 
conflict was marked by numerous shifts of control over the areas claimed by the 
insurgents. The war also underwent numerous escalations and phases of intensified 
violence, which increased the gravity of conflict for the Sri Lankan society.  
3. Conclusion 
The second case study demonstrated how highly mixed character of ethnic 
settlements of Tamils and Sinhalese had aggravating effect on the overall intensity of the 
civil war. The LTTE enjoyed extensive support from rich Diaspora that was formed after 
ethnic clashes resulted in a large exodus of Tamils from Sri Lanka. The motivation 
mechanism explains why the insurgents were cleansing East and North of the island of 
Sinhala and Muslims after they were able to consolidate control over these areas. Both 
the government and rebels were guilty of the extensive use of indiscriminate violence 
against ethnic others in the conflict areas under their control, as well as of employing 
tactics that led to large collateral civilian deaths. Partially, these actions can be attributed 
to deliberate choice of actors to victimize “ethnic others” and part to unstable control of 
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C. CASE STUDY 3: THE SLOVENIAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE 
Table 10.   Country and Conflict Information 
General Country Information 228 
Total area: 20,273 sq km (154th largest in the world) 
Total population: 2,003,136 (July 2010 est., 145th largest in the world)  
Ethnic composition: Slovene 83.1%, Serb 2%, Croat 1.8%, Bosniak 1.1%, other or 
unspecified 12% (2002) 
General Conflict Information229 
Conflict name: Yugoslavia (Slovenia) 
Date of first stated goals 
of incompatibility: 
1 September, 1989 
Date when conflict 
reached 25 battle-related 
deaths: 
28 June, 1991 
Conflict status: Terminated: 4 July, 1991 
Duration of hostilities 
(days): 
9 
Total recorded battle 
deaths: 
63 
1. Conflict Summary  
The Republic of Slovenia was the first to become an independent state during the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. The independence of Slovenia was proclaimed on June 25, 1991 
by the pro-independence leader Milan Kucan. Shortly afterwards, the Yugoslavian 
National Army (JNA) began fighting with  the Slovenian territorial defense (TO) forces. 
According to sources, “International mediation was launched almost immediately and 
eventually led to the signing of the Brioni peace agreement. Despite problems with the 
implementation, the conflict did not resume and Slovenia became an independent state in 
1992.”230 
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Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1990 and early 1991, Slovenia was able to 
consolidate control over the territorial defense (TO) forces by ousting the officers who 
were loyal to Belgrade and directing its share of conscripts to serve in units located on 
Slovenian territory. It did all this while attempting to transform the TO into a standing 
army.231 Within a few days after the declaration of independence, Belgrade mobilized to 
full combat alert the JNA units stationed in Slovenia, and took the border crossings in the 
dissenting republic. The Slovenian TO, together with the loyal police force, struck back 
and “a number of JNA helicopters were shot down on the first day of the armed conflict, 
resulting in several casualties.”232 
The Slovenian TO forces were significantly weaker than the JNA units, but they 
were more motivated. They made extensive use of guerrilla tactics, which they directed 
against the Yugoslav army units and “as for the Yugoslavian government, it seemed at 
times unclear whether it controlled JNA officers and whether it had authorized JNA to 
use force or not.”233 
The international community almost immediately initiated negotiations between 
the different sides of the conflict. The ceasefire was reached relatively quickly despite 
initial unsuccessful attempts.234 According to the UCDP Database, “the [final peace] 
agreement, which was signed on 12 July, provided for an immediate cessation of the 
hostilities. […] The agreement also stated that during the three months, Slovenian police 
would be allowed to control the republic's international borders, while the JNA would be 
in charge of security.”235  
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2. The Major Factors Explaining Conflict Intensity  
PRIO recorded the intensity of violence for this conflict as 7 daily battle deaths, 
which is almost as high as the Tamil insurgency. This case reveals the limitations of the 
intensity measure, since the overall violent impact of the Slovenian civil war is minor 
compared to the civil wars in Sri Lanka or Bosnia. Only 63 people died in combat, which 
is a surprisingly low number compared to the later “divorces” that Slovenia’s neighbors 
had with Yugoslavia.  
Three major aspects differentiate Slovenia from other former Yugoslavian 
political entities. First, it was the most economically developed region in Yugoslavia.236 
Second, it is almost entirely ethnically homogeneous (Figure 7). Unlike the CHT, where 
ethnic minorities also comprise a comparatively low percentage, but are concentrated in 
one contiguous area, in Slovenia it is difficult to pinpoint distinct ethnically 
homogeneous regions belonging to minorities. The territorial defense forces, which in 
Bosnia became the human resource for all sides in the conflict because of their ethnic 
heterogeneity, were almost completely homogeneous in Slovenia. Third, Slovenia was 
the first to leave the Yugoslavian federation and Belgrade was confused as to how to 
respond to the republic’s audacious declaration of independence; an extensive military 
solution to the political problem was too risky and inappropriate.  
The Yugoslavian army (JNA) did not have the local support in this conflict, since 
the overwhelming majority of the population belonged to Slovenian ethnicity. 
Additionally, there was no imminent threat to a large number of ethnic kin from the 
possible actions of the Slovenian separatists. The possible “ethnic targets” for the 
Slovenian TO were few, while the JNA deployed into battle ten times fewer troops than 
the TO did, and thus were on the defensive almost the entire conflict.237 
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Figure 7.   The Ethnic Composition of Slovenia238 
                                                 
238 Map created using ESRI ArcGIS software. http://www.esri.com/ 
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a. Indicators Related to Central Actors 
The central actors in Belgrade were viewing this conflict as a 
constitutional crisis and a threat to the integrity of Yugoslavia. At the same time, other 
members of the federation were increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction, which 
included the ethno-nationalist dimension, and the Slovenian claims for independence 
were perhaps the most “legitimate” in the Belgrade’s eyes and easy to settle. It was 
difficult to argue against the option of national self-determination in the case of 
homogeneous Slovenia.  
Slovenia, on the contrary, was highly motivated to achieve its goal of 
independence. Since it had been obvious from the outset that the major battlefields would 
be located on its territory, which was almost exclusively inhabited by Slovenes, Ljubljana 
and loyal armed forces were compelled to use tactics that would reduce possible 
casualties (for example, they abstained from shelling residential areas). 
Quick international attention to the problem also decreased the likelihood 
that either side of the conflict would be willing to escalate its force. From the diplomatic 
standpoint, there were also few alternatives to Slovenia’s independence from the 
deteriorating federation. 
b. Indicators Related to Perpetrators 
In this conflict, irregular forces attacking small enclaves of enemy 
population were not observed. The battles were largely conducted between JNA on the 
one side, and the TO and police forces on the other. Slovenia’s forces used guerilla 
tactics to compensate for their inferior military capabilities and they limited their targets 
to the opponent’s military forces. The local civilians built barricades and engaged in 




On some occasions, the JNA used tactics that were dangerous for both 
military and civilian targets (cluster bombs), but such use did not have a systematic or 
widespread character. Importantly, the JNA units, which included some Slovenians, were 
not motivated to attack.239 The TO and other forces loyal to Ljubjana were not perceived 
by JNA members as a threat to their ethnic kin.  
c. Indicators Related to Victims 
Overall, the enclaves of the ethnically heterogeneous population that 
would represent either easy-to-attack or hard-to-protect targets were practically absent in 
the conflict. There were few ethnic “others” that the Slovenian military could associate 
the JNA with, or that could be viewed as a “fifth column” or impediments to Ljubljana’s 
territorial and political control. The victims in this conflict were mostly limited to 
military targets; the civilian population did not directly participate in the conflict as 
victims, except for the truck drivers that deliberately blocked the movements of the 
JNA’s columns on several occasions.240  
d. Indicators Related to Environment 
The level of economic and infrastructural development and urbanization in 
Slovenia is higher than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a larger proportion of the 
population living in cities. Additionally, the geographic environment in Slovenia is 
similar to Bosnia. The Slovenian TO forces were able to use the advantages of the terrain 
to attack the JNA forces (for example, blocking the movement of large columns of 
military vehicles in choke points). 
e. Indicators Related to Endogenous Processes of Civil War 
There were no spirals of escalation or revenge and retaliatory attacks 
during this short war. The conflict quickly deescalated, as the sides were able to reach a 
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negotiated agreement. After the peace agreement was reached, JNA forces gradually left 
Slovenian territory without violence. During the war, there were no major or numerous 
changes of territorial control between the warring parties. 
3. Conclusion 
This third case study indicated that Belgrade was not determined to prevent 
Slovenia from secession. In Slovenia, there were no ethnic communities or symbols 
important for the integrity of Serbian ethnic identity that required protection, as in the 
cases of Bosnia or Kosovo. The Slovenian territory almost entirely belonged to the 
Slovenian ethnic group, and legitimacy of its claims to secession was perhaps the most 
acceptable among the demands of all the federal entities. The low intensity of this war 
can be also explained by the Slovenian forces’ absence of ethnic targets and the numeric 
superiority of the TO that did not allow JNA to advance large-scale offensive operations. 
The absence of an ethnically different and weakly protected population made it 
impossible for the conventional fighting to “spill over” into the inter-communal clashes, 
and vice versa. Thus, there are few, if any, indications of the specified motivation and 











D. CASE STUDY 4: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
Table 11.   Country and Conflict Information 
General Country Information 241  
Total area: 51,197 sq km (128th largest in the world) 
Total population: 4,621,598 (July 2010 est., 120th largest in the world) 
Ethnic composition: Bosniak 43%,  Serb 31%,    Croat 17%, other 9% (1991)242 
Bosniak 48%, Serb 37.1%,  Croat 14.3%, other 0.6% (2000) 
General Conflict Information243 
Conflict name: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb) 
Date of first stated goals 
of incompatibility: 
1992 
Date when conflict 
reached 25 battle-related 
deaths: 
30 April, 1992 
Conflict status: Terminated: 21 November, 1995 
Duration of hostilities 
(days): 
1300 




1. Conflict Summary  
Yugoslavia could have been a success story of peaceful ethnic coexistence and 
cooperation between communist and capitalist worlds. Instead, after the collapse of the 
communist regime, a tsunami of ethnic violence destroyed the existing social structures 
and bankrupted the nascent Yugoslav national identity. In 1992, the declared 
independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina provoked fears of minority status among the 
Bosnian Serbs and was used by extreme nationalist Croat and Serb elements to attempt a 
partitioning of the country.244 This confrontation rapidly escalated into one of the 
bloodiest civil wars of all time. Bosnian Serbs and Croats declared the creation of two 
                                                 
241 The Central Intelligence Agency, CIA—the World Factbook. 
242 Uppsala Universitet, UCDP Database. 
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House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia, eds. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway (Durham, 
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independent entities on the Bosnian territory, the Republika Srpska and the Herzeg-
Bosna, in the areas where they had an ethnic majority. Additionally, “in north-western 
Bosnia a rebellious member of the Bosnian state presidency formed an autonomous 
region (the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia), and fought the government 
between 1993 and 1995.”245 In this conflict, numerous loosely organized, irregular groups 
played a decisive role in combat operations and the perpetration of violence along with 
the regular forces.246  
For the most part, local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were able to 
coexist peacefully for decades without attaching great practical importance to a distant 
violent past, and they did not support violence.247 Locals, who were arming themselves 
and organizing into militias, were mostly concerned with self-defense.248 However, a 
series of provocative acts by radical groups and political manipulations were enough for 
the system of shaky mutual trust to collapse.249  
The process of manipulation so easily achieved its goals due to several factors. 
The Balkans had seen many examples of ethnic cleansing, mass deportations, and 
communal violence in the first half of the 20th century, primarily, but not exclusively, 
directed against Muslims.250 These memories were buried, but not too deep, during the 
Tito regime, which produced enough victims, “war criminals” and “state enemies,” 
especially among the nationalists and intellectuals, to give the Balkans a taste of 
violence.251 If not inside the country, then in the Diasporas, virulent ultra-nationalist ideas 
and memories of the abuses were preserved.  
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The domination of the Serb element in the overarching Yugoslav national rhetoric 
added credibility to dissenting secessionist ideas and competition for power between 
local elites. Additionally, Belgrade created enough incentives for the former to advance 
these ideas. The competition of rival factions inside the local elites ensured that the most 
radical elements gained the upper hand.252 In the Yugoslav liberalizing but weak political 
system, these factors combined with the political bankruptcy of previous leadership, 
economic breakdown, and the local realities of highly intermixed ethnic communities on 
top of persisting urban/rural and regional inequalities to create the conditions for the 
outbreak of inter-ethnic violence. 
At the onset of the Bosnian civil war, the Bosnian government had neither an 
organized army nor access to enough weapons. In short, “the defense was largely based 
on a Bosnian territorial defense force. The Bosnian fighters managed to hold off the 
Serbian forces from taking over Sarajevo, but in the rest of the country, the Serbs made 
steady progress.”253 The international system was slow to react to early signs of trouble254 
and its intervention was weak when the violence ensued,255 which added to the 
atmosphere of permissiveness, irresponsibility and impunity. The intense fighting 
continued until late 1995. Eventually, and arguably only due to direct international 
interference into the conflict, the parties were compelled to reach a peace agreement, 
which essentially created a federal government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
2. The Major Factors Explaining Conflict Intensity  
According to PRIO, the intensity of violence is recorded at 34.46 daily battle 
deaths and the total number of killed in battle is estimated at 44,800 (Figure 8). The exact 
figures are still subject to debate, with some sources counting the amount of deaths as 
high as 200,000.256  
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Figure 8.   The Intensity of Bosnian Civil War by Year 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnic geography is highly intermingled both locally 
and regionally (Figure 9). Numerically large Serb and Croat minorities were located in 
several geographic clusters. The proportion of areas cohabited by several ethnicities was 
also very substantial. These factors combined with the presence of a large number of 
militarily empowered local militias having conflicting allegiances to the old and new 
regimes, different ethnic groups and political actors. The Yugoslavian concept of 
territorial defense as a supplement to a standing military meant that large, locally-based, 
and ethnically heterogeneous sections of society were militarized and trained in military 
skills.257 Those skills were put to use in the bloodiest way.  
Together with many conventional battles and movements of troops, the conflict 
was characterized by numerous uncontrolled attacks on poorly protected civilian targets, 
the shelling of civilian targets, and other war crimes.258 
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Figure 9.   The Ethnic Settlements of Serbs in Bosnia259 
                                                 
259 Map created using ESRI ArcGIS software. http://www.esri.com/ 
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a. Indicators Related to Central Actors 
On each side there were irresponsible political manipulators who sought to 
benefit from competition and confrontation instead of promoting cooperation and 
negotiations. They emphasized exclusive (zero-sum) ethnic identities and irreconcilable 
nationalist agendas built on infamous examples of past violence. The extremists were not 
only issuing dark prophesies in an attempt to build their political capital and draw public 
attention, but they were actively engaging in fulfilling their own portents. 
According to the UCDP, “The Yugoslav leadership was also accused of 
manipulating Serbian militias, fanning nationalism and distributing weapons. […] The 
leadership in the Bosnian republic was initially made up of representatives both from the 
Croat, Serb and Muslim communities. However, by spring 1992, when Bosnia had 
become an independent state, Muslims had come to dominate its government.”260 The 
strategic intent behind the Croatian and Serbian efforts in the first part of the war was to 
seize militarily large portions of Bosnian territory, which also had a substantial presence 
of the Bosniak population, and then ethnically “homogenize” these areas to substantiate 
their claims to their new possessions.  
b. Indicators Related to Perpetrators 
In the first phases of conflict, the Yugoslavian national Army (JNA) was 
fighting together with Serb mercenaries and local militias. According to the UCDP, 
The Bosnian Serbs were led by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. 
Their forces were a mixture of nationalists, mercenaries and ordinary 
unemployed people. Many Serbian officers and Bosnian Serb soldiers 
serving in JNA (Yugoslavian National Army) had also been incorporated 
in the Bosnian Serb army. The Bosnian Serbs were assisted by 
independent militias set up by Serbs originating from Serbia or Croatia. 
Many of these irregular forces had previously been active in the conflict 
between the republic of Croatia and Croatian Serbs. At times, the Bosnian 
Serbs and the Serb militias carried out operations together, but occasional 
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clashes between these local Serbs and non-local Serbs also took place. On 
many occasions, it was unclear what force controlled the other. Thus, the 
distinction between JNA, the Bosnian Serb army and Serbian irregulars 
was often hard to make. 261 
After a new Yugoslavian constitution was adopted in May 1992, the JNA 
formally left Bosnia and Herzegovina and ceased to officially support 
local Serbian forces. However, it allegedly continued supporting the 
irregular Serb forces participating in the conflict.262  
In numerous cases, the irregular and standing military forces were found guilty of war 
crimes. The local component of the irregular militias was instrumental in identifying and 
persecuting targets among the ethnic “others.”263  
c. Indicators Related to Victims 
The conflict was markedly fought along ethnic lines and characterized by 
major victimization of civilians. For example, the safe areas were shelled on repeated 
occasions. According to the UCDP, “the killing of civilians based on their ethnic 
affiliation was undertaken on a large scale. This so-called 'ethnic cleansing' strategy 
claimed tens of thousands of lives.”264  
d. Indicators Related to Environment 
The population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was predominantly rural, with 
a medium to low density. Most areas were ethnically heterogeneous and the level of the 
development of infrastructure and economy was one of the lowest in Yugoslavia. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are located in mountainous region, making effective communication, 
coordination and control of the friendly forces difficult to achieve. At the same time, 
these geographic conditions made escape easier in some cases, which is also evidenced 
by the large number of refugees that fled from conflict zones.  
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e. Indicators Related to Endogenous Processes of Civil War 
The conflict was almost entirely characterized by intense fighting. As 
stated by UCDP, “A high level of fighting continued throughout 1994. Ceasefires were 
agreed upon only to quickly be broken. […] The Bosnian Serbs violated the UN safe 
areas repeatedly throughout the year, which led to intense fighting between the Bosnian 
Serbs and UN.”265 Serbian forces initially achieved control over large parts of the 
territory inhabited by the Bosniaks, but in the second phase of the campaign the Bosnian 
control over these areas was regained. The targeting of unprotected civilians, the mass 
murders and the other war crimes that were committed throughout the civil war were 
endemic.  
3. Conclusion 
The Bosnian case is one the most intense ethnic conflicts in modern history. Both 
of the mechanisms that are specified in this thesis as a link between settlement patterns 
and violence were featured heavily in this civil war. All parties involved in the conflict 
(excluding peacekeepers) targeted small enclaves of ethnically diverse populations on a 
mass scale and ethnic cleansing of conquered areas became one of the major 
characteristics of the conflict. At the same time, no central authority could exercise 
enough control over its forces to allow for damage control. Small but multiple gangs and 
militias were engaged in mass killings of ethnic enemies, clashes with peacekeepers and 
security forces, and skirmishes among themselves. The atmosphere of chaos that ruled in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for two and a half years is responsible for tens, if not hundreds, 
of thousands of deaths.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In all four cases, the ethnic settlement patterns played different, but important 
roles in determining the trajectory and scope of violence. The case studies demonstrated 
that ethnic settlement patterns deserve close inspection in every attempt to explain the 
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intensity of fighting in ethnic civil wars (Table 12). Low regional and local intermingling 
between the ethnic groups that are associated with conflicting parties has been found to 
coincide with generally low intensity of civil war. The Slovenian case is a good example 
of this link. In the most ambiguous Bangladesh case, where the degree of local 
intermingling between ethnic groups increased during the conflict, we observed the 
deliberate actions of military forces to create segregated communities and “harden” 
ethnic targets, thus preventing possible operation of the motivation mechanism. The 
decentralized command and control of insurgents that should have enabled the 
organizational mechanism, demonstrated the importance of the tradeoff between military 
capability and command and control function. Weak control and factionalism in the 
insurgent organization also coincided with their military weakness and numerical 
inferiority compared to the enemy, thus preventing them from accomplishing goals that 
are more ambitious and potentially more deadly.  
Table 12.   Violence and Settlement-related Factors Observed in the Studied Cases 
Case 
Factor  
Bangladesh Sri Lanka Slovenia Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Battle intensity  Low High Low High 
Overall severity Medium High Low High 
Regional 




medium Low High 
Opportunity 
mechanism Rare Present Not observed Present 
Organizational 



















ethnic others were 
on defensive (JNA) 
None 
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High level of local and regional intermingling, both in Sri Lankan and Bosnian 
cases, coincided with the high intensity of violence. Huge loss of civilian life through 
violence in conventional battles, guerilla operations, terrorist acts and mass murders can 
be attributed both to deliberate choices of actors (motivation mechanism), and their 
neglect (organizational mechanism). 
In both civil wars, widespread use of conventional tactics was also responsible for 
a lot of violence. At the same time, violence from such operations is more easily and fully 
recorded in official accounts of the civil wars. while other types of battle related violence 
are arguably less systematically collected. The information that would allow thorough 
analysis of cases of ethnic violence is often missing due to the deliberate policies of the 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In the observable future, the right of ethno-nationalist groups for self-
determination is likely to continue to affect international relations and global security. Its 
violent manifestations will continue to take human lives throughout the world. As an 
analytic concept, ethnic civil wars are far from being the ideal subject, since it is often 
difficult to separate political violence from other forms of violence, and genuinely ethnic 
causes of conflict from non-ethnic causes. Still, despite its ambiguities, the distinction 
between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars remains an informative and valid matter of 
study.266 
The overwhelming majority of scholarly attention has, until recently, been 
devoted only to determining factors that cause the onset of civil war and ethnic conflict. 
And while it is important to know what causes war, that information alone is not enough. 
The question this thesis attempted to address was why some inter-ethnic conflicts result 
in significantly more violence than others do. The suggested answers to this complex 
problem were by no means complete, since a comprehensive theory of ethnic civil war 
has still to be formulated.  
The major focus of this thesis has been on ethnic civil war as specific 
environment, which, this thesis argued, informs actors’ decisions in unique ways. As 
previously stated, settlement patterns of ethnic groups fighting civil wars can present 
strategic challenges for the insurgents, the involved states, and the international 
community. The more the conflicting actors’ population bases are intermixed, the easier 
targets they become, and the more loosely controlled militant units they are likely to 
produce. The intermingling can occur on a local and regional scale, with clusters of 
homogeneous population ranging in size from several households to entire 
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civil wars, which means that some other factors may be more important in determining intensity of ethnic 
violence.  
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provinces/regions. Abundance of small and weak enclaves easily attacked by 
unrestrained or poorly controlled armed groups, increase the likelihood of greater harm 
and human suffering in the conflict.  
Within this logic, this thesis has proposed and tested two mechanisms that link 
ethnic settlements to the intensity of fighting. The motivational mechanism, which treats 
intensity of conflict and casualty counts as premeditated damage, posits that actors 
choose to attack the smaller enclaves of ethnically different populations as a preventive 
strike to secure the survival of their own ethnic kin, or because these enclaves represent 
easy targets. The organizational mechanism, which views greater intensity of conflict in 
more mixed communities as collateral damage, posits that interspersed ethnic groups are 
likely to produce an abundance of small, disconnected, and loosely organized militant 
units, which are virtually impossible to effectively manage and command, and, 
subsequently, it becomes impossible to control the amount of damage. 
The general empirical test of the hypotheses using geospatial data on the ethnic 
settlement patterns was conducted in the statistical part of this thesis, while the case study 
section concentrated on identifying the indicators that may show the actual presence of 
the specified mechanisms in particular civil wars. As expected, the evidence found during 
the case analysis suggested that, together with other factors, settlement patterns have an 
important impact on the intensity of violence in ethnic civil wars. All four case studies 
demonstrated that the ethnic settlement patterns played different, but important roles in 
determining the trajectory and scope of violence. Therefore, ethnic settlement patterns 
deserve a close inspection when attempting to explain the intensity of fighting in ethnic 
civil wars. 
The case studies, which allowed a closer look not only at the data collected in 
GeoEPR and GREG, but also on detailed accounts of events and conflict data, found 
convincing evidence that the proposed hypotheses are valid and the specified causal 
mechanisms are operating in the conflict environment. Low regional and local 
intermingling between the ethnic groups that are associated with conflicting parties has 
been found to coincide with generally low intensity of civil war. The Slovenian case is a 
good example of this link. In the most ambiguous Bangladesh case, where the degree of 
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local intermingling between ethnic groups increased during the conflict, military forces 
deliberately attempted to create segregated communities and “harden” ethnic targets, thus 
preventing possible operation of the motivation mechanism. The decentralized command 
and control of insurgents that should have enabled the organizational mechanism, 
demonstrated the importance of the tradeoff between military capability and command 
and control function. Weak control and factionalism in the insurgent organization 
coincided with their military weakness and numerical inferiority compared to the enemy, 
thus preventing them from accomplishing goals that were more ambitious and potentially 
more deadly.  
High level of local and regional intermingling, both in Sri Lankan and Bosnian 
cases, coincided with the high intensity of violence. Huge loss of civilian life through 
violence in conventional battles, guerilla operations, terrorist acts and mass murders can 
be attributed both to deliberate choices of actors (motivation mechanism), and their 
inability to prevent local perpetrators from inflicting unnecessary damage (organizational 
mechanism). In both civil wars, widespread use of conventional tactics was also 
responsible for a lot of violence. At the same time, violence from such operations is more 
easily and fully recorded in official accounts of the civil wars, while other types of battle 
related violence are arguably less systematically collected. 
Unfortunately, the statistical analysis did not provide definitive results that would 
allow confirming or refuting of the hypotheses regarding ethnic settlement patterns and 
the intensity of violence in ethnic civil wars. It is not entirely clear whether poor results 
point to the non-relationship between the ethnic settlement patterns and intensity of 
violence, or the deficiencies of existing data did not allow capturing that relationship. 
Data limitations did not allow achieving more unambiguous results in the statistical part 
of this research. The collection of relevant information remains the major challenge for 
the research on civil wars. Even the data on battle deaths may not be accurately collected 
because the host nation or independent sources do not report such data for various 
reasons, or the casualties are codified not as battle deaths but communal or one-sided 
violence. The deficit of accurate information on civil wars and ethnic conflicts will 
continue to plague the credibility of research results.  
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At the same time, additional factors were found to correlate with higher intensity 
of ethnic violence. It has been found that the variables that proxy democracy in the 
respective states and political status of the respective ethnic group are statistically 
significant predictors of violence. The direction of their influence on conflict intensity 
indicates that regimes that are more democratic face lower risk of severe casualties in 
ethnic civil wars, while groups that enjoy higher political status in the respective society 
face greater risk of more violent war. Thus, groups that have had higher standing in less 
democratic societies are associated with greater intensity of violence. As a tentative 
explanation, it has been suggested that for groups that have enjoyed higher status in 
undemocratic states, the stakes in the conflict are higher (e.g., they view conflict as a 
zero-sum game), or they have better access to military resources. Since the impact of 
these factors was not fully investigated here, future research may examine this finding 
further.  
Certain criteria must be met in order for further research efforts to achieve better 
understanding of the ethnic civil conflicts. First, a better and more fine-grained data is 
required on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. The intensity measure could include not only 
the estimates of battle-related deaths, but also other negative impacts of civil wars. 
Second, as the ethnic conflicts continue to take human lives, there is an acute need to 
create a more comprehensive and accurate account of ethnicities and their boundaries. 
Future studies would undoubtedly benefit from such major data collection efforts. 
Further research in the area investigated in this thesis may include into analysis other 
specific factors that potentially affect conflict intensity, and focus on specific roles of 
different actors or types of actors in the conflict. The mechanisms outlined here can be 
further investigated in cases outside the realm of civil conflict, but inside the realm of 
ethnic violence—namely, in genocidal and communal violence.  
What do the findings in this thesis suggest with respect to policy options for the 
states and international community towards current and future possible ethnic conflicts? 
Promoting international security is an expensive and resource demanding mission. Since 
civil wars and ethnic conflicts are many, eventually the international community faces the 
need to prioritize its efforts. Domestically, governments also need to effectively distribute 
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their limited resources, especially in conflict prone countries. Because of this lack of 
resources, potential intensity of war is a critical principle for the prioritization of efforts 
directed at managing crises, both in terms of preventing great loss of human life and 
decreasing the second-order effects of intense fighting in post-conflict environment. If the 
likelihood of greater intensity in the unfolding conflict is higher, it definitely deserves 
more attention from the international community or the corresponding state. If the 
conflict is potentially more deadly, more resources may be allocated to prevent 
escalation, even to include physical separation of affected communities after the conflict 
onset.267 Better understanding of ethnic war would allow choosing adequate actions that 
reduce the risk of high casualties in the conflicts. 
In most cases (like in Bosnia or Sri Lanka) the local communities have peacefully 
coexisted for decades or even centuries, which makes the ensuing severe violence during 
conflict in such settings especially hard to explain. Thus, the choice of adequate option by 
a state or international community must be informed by better understanding of factors 
that cause higher intensity. These options include pacification efforts, disarmament, 
resettlement, military conventional and counterinsurgency operations, together with the 
information operations and public campaigns that would restore trust in damaged society.  
The previous cases of mass atrocities demand our continued attention to the 
question of conflict intensity. If it is impossible to prevent all violence altogether, the 
governments and the international community should at least seek to reduce the human 
costs of conflicts, including ethnic civil wars. 
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APPENDIX A.  MATCHING THE EPR AND PRIO DATASETS  
Since the Ethnic Power Relation’s dataset uses the same coding of conflicts as the 
EAC dataset (though it should be noted that the EAC includes more information about 
the episodes coded as ethnic conflicts), this study will use EAC to match EPR (and, 
subsequently, GeoEPR) to the PRIO’s data on conflicts and battle deaths.  
In some cases, multiple groups are recorded as fighting the same war. Since 
casualties suffered by separate actors cannot be discerned, this study will aggregate such 
groups into a meta-group. In other cases, one group may be fighting several conflicts. If 
there is only one observation of settlements for such groups, the separate episodes of 
conflicts they fight will have to be aggregated to obtain one measure of intensity.  
In many cases, the EAC’s dataset years of conflict did not match the years of 
conflict as coded in PRIO. The major reason for this can include different requirements 
for inclusion of conflicts into the datasets.268 While this thesis adopts the PRIO definition 
of conflict, it adopts the EAC’s and EPR’s definition of ethnic conflict. 
Table 13.   Matching the EPR/EAC Episodes to PRIO Cases 
PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
2 01.08.1946 31.12.1953    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
5 01.01.1946 30.06.1949    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
6 01.01.1979 31.12.1988 
6 01.01.1990 31.12.1990 
6 01.01.1993 31.12.1993 
6 01.01.1996 31.12.1996 
10602 1979 1996 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case* 
8 01.01.1946 31.12.1946    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
9 01.03.1946 31.10.1953    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
                                                 
268 For more information on coding rules used in EAC, see the EAC website at 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=36583 (accessed October 22, 
2010). For coding rules of PRIO, see the UCDP PRIO website at 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ (accessed October 22, 2010).  
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PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
10 01.09.1969 13.12.1995 
10 23.11.1997 22.12.1997 
10 06.06.1999 31.12.2008 
11001 1969 2005 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
17 20.11.1946 21.07.1954    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
19 01.06.1947 18.09.1948    
Dropped because of missing 
information on settlement 
patterns 
21 29.03.1947 31.12.1947    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
23 01.02.1949* 28.04.1992 
23 27.01.1995 31.12.1995 
23 01.01.1997 31.12.2003 
23 12.04.2005 31.12.2008 
12300 1948* 2005 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
24 20.03.1990 31.12.1992 
24 01.01.1994 31.12.1994 12401 1990 1994 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
25 01.01.1948 31.12.1988 
25 29.12.1991 31.12.1992 
25 01.01.1994 31.12.1994 
12500 1948 1994 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
26 27.03.1990 31.12.1990 
26 23.12.1996 31.12.1996 12601 1990 1996 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
29 01.01.1990 31.12.1994 
29 01.01.1996 31.12.2008 12902 1990 2005 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
31 19.06.1948 31.08.1957    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
37 01.01.1949 31.12.1964 
37 01.01.1965 31.12.1996 
37 01.11.2000 31.12.2008 
13700 1949 2005 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
41 30.10.1950 01.11.1950    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
44 22.10.1952 31.12.1956    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
47 07.11.1953 02.03.1956    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
48 01.04.1953 31.01.1956    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
49 29.11.1954 18.03.1962    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
51 02.06.1955 19.02.1959    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
54 01.01.1956 31.12.1959 
54 01.01.1961 15.06.1968 15400 1956 1968 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
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PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
54 01.07.1992 01.08.1997 
54 01.01.2000 31.12.2000 
54 23.01.2005 31.12.2007 
15401 1992 2005 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
56 01.01.1992 31.12.1992 
56 01.01.1996 31.12.1996 
56 16.01.2005 13.12.2005 
15601 1992 2005 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
57 01.09.1957 31.12.1959    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
59 12.01.1957 30.06.1958    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
60 23.11.1957 31.12.1958    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
62 01.08.1982 31.12.1984 
62 01.01.1987 31.12.1987 
62 01.01.1991 31.12.1996 
16201 1982 1996 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
63 02.09.1975 22.10.1976 
63 01.09.1982 29.09.1986 
63 15.03.1989 13.10.1990 
16301 1975 1990 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
64 15.01.1974 31.12.1975 
64 01.01.1981 31.12.1981 16401 1974 1981 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
65 12.11.1959 26.04.1961 
65 01.01.1963 22.02.1973 16500 1959 1973 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
66 04.02.1961 27.07.1974    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
67 22.11.1959* 31.12.1970 
67 01.01.1972 31.12.1973 
67 01.01.1976 31.12.1988 
67 01.01.1993 31.12.2002 
67 27.12.2005 31.12.2008 
16700 1960* 2005 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
73 22.04.1961 30.06.1962    Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
76 08.02.1962 31.12.1962    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
78 15.03.1964 28.05.1991    
Added into analysis as 17800 
(1964–1974) and 17801(1975–
1991) 
80 01.04.1982 31.12.1982    Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
82 01.02.1963 31.12.1973    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
86 25.11.2006 31.12.2008    
Added to 18602 since new 
episode continued with the 
same ethnic group 
88 19.11.1964 27.07.1974    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
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PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
89 25.11.1964 30.11.1967    Dropped from analysis as an extrasystemic war 
90 26.11.1991 31.12.1992 
90 18.10.1994 07.09.2006* 19001 1991 2005*
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
90 01.03.2008 31.12.2008    
Added to 19001, since new 
episode continued with the 
same ethnic group 
94 28.07.1965 31.12.1965 
94 01.01.1967 31.12.1969 
94 01.01.1976 31.12.1978 
19400 1965 1978 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
95 14.11.2007 31.12.2008    Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
98 31.12.1981 31.12.1981 
98 19.06.1983 19.06.1983 19801 1981 1983 
Dropped from analysis as a 
non-ethnic conflict 
101 26.08.1966 22.12.1988    Added as 20100 
119 01.08.1971 15.12.1991 
119 15.08.1998 18.08.1998 21900 1971 1998 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
122 05.09.1967 31.12.1968    Added to 22200 
129 01.08.2004 31.12.2008    Added to 22900 
130 30.04.1997 31.12.1997 
130 01.01.1999 31.12.1999 
130 01.01.2003 31.12.2003 
23000 1997 2003 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
131 11.11.1975 31.12.1995 
131 12.03.1998 04.04.2002 23100 1975 2002 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
133 26.02.1994 31.12.1994    Added to 23301 
133 01.01.1996 31.12.1996 
133 01.01.1999 31.12.2002 
133 01.01.2004 31.12.2008* 
23301 1996 2005* Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
134 07.12.1975 31.12.1989 
134 15.12.1992 31.12.1992 
134 31.05.1997 31.12.1998 
23400 1975 1998 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
139 01.01.1978 12.08.1988 
139 12.10.1992 23.08.1993 
139 31.10.1995 31.12.1995 
139 01.01.1997 31.12.2004 
23900 1978 2004 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
139 07.11.2006 31.12.2006    Added to 23900 
141 01.01.1982* 31.12.1984 
141 03.03.1986 31.12.1996 24101 1981* 1996 
Dropped as a non-ethnic 
conflict 
141 24.10.2006 31.12.2008    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
142 03.08.1979 03.08.1979    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
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PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
143 01.01.1979 31.12.1982 
143 01.01.1986 31.12.1988 
143 01.01.1991 31.12.1993 
143 01.01.1997 31.12.1997 
143 01.01.1999 31.12.2001 
24400 1979 2001 Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
147 03.10.1980 31.12.1981 
147 01.01.1987 31.12.1987 
147 01.01.1991 31.12.1992 
24800 1980 1992 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
150 01.01.1981 31.12.1983 
150 26.06.1985 31.12.1988 25100 1981 1988 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
152 01.07.1982 31.12.1988 
152 01.01.1992 31.12.2000 
152 01.01.2003 31.12.2008* 
25300 1982 2005* Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
157 10.09.1984 24.12.2001 
157 23.06.2003 31.12.2003 25800 1983 2003 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
157 02.12.2005 31.12.2008    Added to 25800 
158 01.01.1960 31.12.1961    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
167 29.11.1989 29.11.1989    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
168 01.06.1975 31.12.1976    Added to 26900 
170 29.05.1990 31.12.1991 
170 01.01.1994 31.12.2008* 27100 1990 2005*
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
171 08.09.1990 31.07.1991 
171 19.06.1999 12.10.2005 27200 1990 2005 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
174 28.10.1989 31.12.1990 
174 02.08.1992 31.12.1996 27600 1989 1996 
Dropped as a non-ethnic 
conflict 
177 21.07.1990 31.12.1990 
177 04.10.1994 31.12.1994 27900 1990 1994 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
177 31.08.2007 31.12.2008    Added to 27900 
180 01.08.1990 31.12.1990 
180 01.09.1992 08.07.1993 
180 27.04.1995 31.12.1995 
180 23.03.1997 31.12.1997 
180 11.04.2000 31.12.2001 
180 01.01.2003 31.12.2003 
28200 1990 2003 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
184 13.11.1991 26.12.1994    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
184 24.07.1999 31.12.1999    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
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PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
192 01.06.1991 31.12.1991 
192 01.01.1994 31.12.1994 
192 01.01.1996 31.12.1998 
192 01.01.2002 31.12.2002 
192 01.01.2004 31.12.2004 
29400 1991 2004 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
192 01.01.2007 31.12.2007    Added to 29400 
195 01.07.1992 23.12.1993 
195 03.05.1995 12.11.1995 29700 1992 1995 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
198 08.08.2008 31.12.2008    Added to 30001 
200 29.06.1992 23.12.1996 
200 24.03.1998 09.11.1998 30200 1992 1998 
Dropped as a non-ethnic 
conflict 
201 04.06.1993 18.06.1993 
201 17.03.1995 17.03.1995 30300 1993 1995 
Dropped as a non-ethnic 
conflict 
206 11.12.1994 31.08.1996 
206 11.08.1999 07.10.2007* 30900 1994 2005*
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
209 01.06.1990 31.12.1990 
209 01.01.1995 31.12.1996 31200 1990 1996 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
209 15.07.2007 31.12.2008    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
211 01.07.1995* 31.12.1996 
211 01.01.1999 31.12.1999 31400 1996* 1999 
Dropped as a non-ethnic 
conflict 
213 05.09.1997 13.12.1997    
Dropped because of absence 
of group settlement 
information both in GeoEPR 
and GREG 
214 04.11.1993 30.01.1994 
214 06.06.1997 29.12.1999 
214 10.04.2002 31.12.2002 
31700 1993 2002 Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
219 01.01.1977 31.12.1978    Added to 32200 
219 01.01.1980 31.12.1981    Added to 32200 
219 01.07.1983 31.12.1985    Added to 32200 
219 01.11.1987* 31.12.1992 
219 01.01.1994 31.12.1995 
219 01.01.1998 31.12.2008* 
32200 1989* 2005* Combined PRIO episodes in corresponding EAC case 
222 18.05.1996 25.01.1997    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
222 27.11.2006 31.12.2006    Dropped because episode does not include EAC timeframe 
224 11.09.2001 31.12.2002    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
224 01.01.2004 31.12.2008    Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
227 16.03.1989 31.12.1990 
227 01.01.1993 15.10.2004 33100 1989 2004 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
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PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr
Decision 
250 05.06.2004 29.09.2004    Defined as 34100 (new PRIO conflict id 250) 
251 10.07.1990 31.12.1999    
Defined as 34200 (new PRIO 
conflict id 251). Dropped from 
analysis due to absence of 
relevant ethnic categories. 
251 13.07.2006 14.08.2006    
Defined as 34201 (new PRIO 
conflict id 251). Dropped from 
analysis due to absence of 
relevant ethnic categories. 
253 15.12.1975 31.12.1978    
Defined as 34300 (new PRIO 
conflict id 253). Dropped from 
analysis due to absence of 
relevant ethnic categories. 
254 01.02.2007 31.12.2008    Defined as 34400 (new PRIO conflict id 254)  
255 01.12.1991 31.12.1992    Defined as 34500 (new PRIO conflict id 255) 
255 19.10.1997 29.11.1997    Defined as 34500 (new PRIO conflict id 255) 
255 01.07.2007 31.12.2008    Defined as 34500 (new PRIO conflict id 255) 
257 28.11.2007 31.12.2008    
Defined as 34600 (new PRIO 
conflict id 257). Dropped from 
analysis due to absence of 
relevant ethnic categories. 
258 30.10.2008 31.12.2008    
Defined as 34700 (new PRIO 
conflict id 258). Dropped from 
analysis due to absence of 
relevant ethnic categories. 
259 09.11.2008 31.12.2008    
Defined as 34800 (new PRIO 
conflict id 259). Dropped from 
analysis due to absence of 
relevant ethnic categories. 
Since the battle death data is taken from PRIO, duration of episodes is also taken 
from PRIO. This is due to the fact that this study is only interested in the periods of 
warfare. Also, this study continues the EAC’s episodes duration until 2008 if the start 
year of the episode is before or includes 2005, or if the new episode in PRIO after 2005 is 




Table 14.   Episodes Present in the EPR/EAC but Absent in PRIO 
PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr 
Decision 
28   12800 1947 1948 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
32   13200 1948 1950 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
85   18501 1983 2004 
Since these years are included in 
21302, these two cases (18501 
and 21302) were analyzed 
together 
18602 1996 1997 86 18.10.1996 31.12.2001 18603 1998 2001 
Joined these two EAC episodes 
and analyzed as ethnic conflict 
103 02.04.1967 17.04.1975 20300 1967 1969 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
103 02.04.1967 17.04.1975 20301 1970 1975 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
103 01.12.1978 25.12.1998 20302 1978 1978 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
103 01.12.1978 25.12.1998 20303 1979 1998 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
111   21100 1970 1970 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
137 27.04.1978 07.12.2001 23700 1978 1992 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
137 27.04.1978 07.12.2001 23701 1992 1996 Defined in PRIO as separate episode (23701) 
23702 1996 1999 Added 23702 to 23703, defined as separate episode (23702) 137 27.04.1978 07.12.2001 
23703 2000 2001 Added 23702 to 23703, defined as separate episode (23702) 
249 23.09.2004 31.12.2004 33300 2004 2004 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 








Table 15.   Differences in EPR/EAC and PRIO Start and End Years Coding 
PRIO EAC 
ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr 
Decision 
23 01.02.1949* 28.04.1992 
23 27.01.1995 31.12.1995 
23 01.01.1997 31.12.2003 
23 12.04.2005 31.12.2008 
12300 1948* 2005 Adopted PRIO’s start and end dates 
67 22.11.1959* 31.12.1970 
67 01.01.1972 31.12.1973 
67 01.01.1976 31.12.1988 
67 01.01.1993 31.12.2002 
67 27.12.2005 31.12.2008 
16700 1960* 2005 Adopted PRIO’s start and end dates 
90 26.11.1991 31.12.1992 
90 18.10.1994 07.09.2006* 19001 1991 2005* 
Adopted PRIO’s start and end 
dates 
91 01.07.1966 30.09.1972 19100 1965 1978 Added years 1976, 1977, and 1978 to PRIO episode 
91 28.02.1976 31.12.1984 19101 1980 1984 
Dropped from analysis as a 
non-ethnic conflict (except for 
years 1976, 1977, and 1978, 
included in 19100) 
91 01.01.1986* 01.11.1987 
91 03.03.1989 31.12.1994* 19102 1987* 1997* 
Combined PRIO episodes in 
corresponding EAC case 
91 30.10.1997* 31.12.2002 19103 1998* 2002 Adopted PRIO’s start and end dates 
91 18.12.2005 31.12.2008* 19104 2005 2005* Added succeeding years 
118   21800 1971 1971 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
118 25.01.1971* 31.12.1972 21801 1972* 1972 Adopted PRIO’s start and end dates 
118 23.03.1974 25.03.1974    Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
118   21802 1977 1979 Dropped from analysis as a non-ethnic conflict 
118 01.10.1978 31.12.1992 21804 1981 1986 
Dropped from analysis as a 
non-ethnic conflict (except for 
years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990, 1991, and 1992, which 
were included in 21805) 
118 21.02.1994 18.10.2007* 21805 1986 2005* 
Added  to analysis with years 
1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 
1991, and 1992 included 
133 01.01.1996 31.12.1996 
133 01.01.1999 31.12.2002 
133 01.01.2004 31.12.2008* 
23301 1996 2005* Adopted PRIO’s start and end dates 
137 04.06.2003 31.12.2008* 23704 2003 2005* Dropped as a non-ethnic conflict 
141 01.01.1982* 31.12.1984 
141 03.03.1986 31.12.1996 24101 1981* 1996 
Adopted PRIO’s start and end 




ID StartDate2 (dd.mm.yyyy) 
EpEndDate 
(dd.mm.yyyy) Warid startyr endyr 
Decision 
152 01.07.1982 31.12.1988 
152 01.01.1992 31.12.2000 
152 01.01.2003 31.12.2008* 
25300 1982 2005* Adopted PRIO’s start and end dates 
170 29.05.1990 31.12.1991 
170 01.01.1994 31.12.2008* 27100 1990 2005* 
Adopted PRIO’s start and end 
dates 
206 11.12.1994 31.08.1996 
206 11.08.1999 07.10.2007* 30900 1994 2005* 
Adopted PRIO’s start and end 
dates 
211 01.07.1995* 31.12.1996 
211 01.01.1999 31.12.1999 31400 1996* 1999 
Adopted PRIO’s start and end 
dates, Dropped as a non-
ethnic conflict 
219 01.11.1987* 31.12.1992 
219 01.01.1994 31.12.1995 
219 01.01.1998 31.12.2008* 




APPENDIX B. THE ETHNIC POWER RELATIONS DATASET’S 
WAR CODING AND THE GREG GROUPS CODING 
In Appendix A, the ethnic conflicts from the EPR and GeoEPR datasets were 
joined with the PRIO data. In this appendix, the same definitions of conflicts that were 
obtained as a result of matching EPR to PRIO are used. 
Table 16.   The List of Initial Discrepancies in Names Between GREG and EPR 
GREGid GREG Name CowGREGid Warid GeoEPR Name 
6 Acholi 5000006 21801 Langi/Acholi 
77 Assamese 7500077 27100 Assamese (non-SC/ST) 
86 Aymara 1452001 10101 Quechua; Aymara 
87 Azande 6252002 18500 
Azande; Bari; Latoka; Other Southern 
groups 
88 Azerbaijanians 3650088 28400 Azerbaijanis 
98 Bagirmi 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
110 Bakongo 4840110 31700 Lari/Bakongo; Mbochi (proper) 
117 Baloch 7700117 22900 Baluchis 
120 Baluba 4900120 16900 Luba Kasai 
122 Balunda 5402007 23100 Lunda-Chokwe;Ovimbundu-Ovambo 
129 Banda 6252003 21302 





4500135 24700 Indigenous Peoples 
144 Bari 6252002 18500 
Azande; Bari; Latoka; Other Southern 
groups 
173 Berta 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
324 Danakil 5300324 26900 Afar 
332 Dinka 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
350 
English Irish and 
Scotch Irish 
2000350 21900 Catholics In N. Ireland 
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GREGid GREG Name CowGREGid Warid GeoEPR Name 
362 Ewe 4610362 26400 Ewe (and related groups) 
376 Fulbe 4710376 25900 
Fulani (and other northern Muslim 
peoples) 
387 Galla 5300387 32200 Oroma 
396 Gere 4502010 24703 Krahn (Guere); Mandingo 
404 Gola 4502010 24703 Krahn (Guere); Mandingo 
434 Hazara-Berberi 7002009 23702 Hazaras;Tajiks; Uzbeks 
435 Hazara-Deh-i-Zainat 7002009 23702 Hazaras;Tajiks; Uzbeks 
459 Ibo 4750459 20000 Igbo 
464 Ijo 4750464 34100 Ijaw 
472 Iran Arabs 6300472 24500 Arabs 
475 Iraq Arabs 6450475 16201 Shi'a Arabs 
501 
Jordan and Palestine 
Arabs 
6660501 13700 Israeli Arabs; Palestinian Arabs 
506 Kacharis 7500506 33100 Bodo 
535 Karen 7750535 12300 Kayin (Karens) 
574 Koma 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
583 Kpelle 4502010 24703 Krahn (Guere); Mandingo 
594 Kulango 4372013 32800 Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) 
620 Lebanon Arabs 6600620 16300 
Palestinians (Arab); Shi'a Muslims 
(Arab);Sunnis (Arab) 
634 Livonians 3650634 11200 Latvians 
636 Lobi 4372013 32800 Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) 
639 Loma 4502010 24703 Krahn (Guere); Mandingo 
640 Lotuko 6252002 18500 
Azande; Bari; Latoka; Other Southern 
groups 
646 Lushei 7500646 19900 Mizo 
689 Mandingo 4372013 32800 Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) 
696 Manipuris 7500696 25300 Manipuri 
698 Mano 4500698 24701 Gio;Mano 
710 Marind-anim, Sentani 8500710 19400 Papua 
719 Mashona 5410719 23600 Shona-Ndau 
723 Matebele 5522006 22200 Africans 
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GREGid GREG Name CowGREGid Warid GeoEPR Name 
748 Miao 8120748 16502 Hmong 
760 Mon (Talaing) 7750760 12600 Mons 
789 Murle 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
795 Nagas 7500795 15400 Naga 
825 Northern Lwo 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
828 Nubians 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
829 Nuer 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
852 Ovambo 5402007 23100 Lunda-Chokwe;Ovimbundu-Ovambo 
853 Ovimbundu 5402007 23100 Lunda-Chokwe;Ovimbundu-Ovambo 
872 Panjabis 7500872 25700 Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST) 
926 Quechua 1452001 10101 Quechua; Aymara 
979 Senufo 4372013 32800 Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) 
999 Shoa-Arabs 4832005 19104 Arabs; Tamas 
1019 Somalis 5301019 23300 Somali (Ogaden) 
1028 Sudan Arabs 4832005 19104 Arabs; Tamas 
1042 Syria Arabs 6521042 20201 Sunni Arabs 
1051 Tajiks 7002009 23702 Hazaras;Tajiks; Uzbeks 
1054 Tama 4832005 19104 Arabs; Tamas 
1057 Tamils 7801057 25800 Sri Lankan Tamils 
1070 Tem 4611070 26401 KabrΘ (and related groups) 
1082 Teso 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
1094 Tigre 5301094 17001 Tigry 
1097 Tippera 7501097 23900 Indigenous Tripuri 
1114 Tonga 5522006 22200 Africans 
1123 Trinidad Islanders 521123 28500 Blacks 
1136 Tuaregs 4322012 27900 Whites (Tuareg & Arabs) 
1137 Tubu 4361137 31500 Toubou 
1170 Uzbeks 7002009 23702 Hazaras;Tajiks; Uzbeks 
1180 Wachokwe 5402007 23100 Lunda-Chokwe;Ovimbundu-Ovambo 
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GREGid GREG Name CowGREGid Warid GeoEPR Name 
1218 West Sahara Arabs 4322012 27900 Whites (Tuareg & Arabs) 
1222 Xosa 5602011 25100 Xhosa;Zulu 
1243 Zagawa 4831243 19102 Hadjera∩; Zaghawa, Bideyat 
1248 Zulus 5602011 25100 Xhosa;Zulu 
1260 For 6252003 21302 
Dinka;Fur; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern 
groups 
 
Some groups participated in more than one conflict (they are defined as distinct 
conflicts in EAC, but in most cases PRIO defines them as separate episodes of the same 
conflict, which is seen from the first four digits of the EAC Warid coding). 
Table 17.   GREG Groups Participation in More Than One Conflict 
cowcode statename group GREGid Warid Included Warids 
630 Iran Kurds 600 10600 10601, 10602 
775 Myanmar Karen 535 12300 15600, 15601 
775 Myanmar Mon (Talaing) 760 12600 12601 
775 Myanmar Kachins 507 13400 13401 
750 India Nagas 795 15400 15401 
645 Iraq Iraq Arabs 475 16201 16203 
660 Lebanon Lebanon Arabs 620 16300 16301 
475 Nigeria Ibo 459 20000 20700 
840 Philippines Moro 768 21200 21201 
500 Uganda Acholi 6 21801 21805 
530 Ethiopia Somalis 1019 23300 23301 
530 Ethiopia Danakil 324 26900 26901 
436 Niger Tuaregs 1136 28000 34500 
373 Azerbaijan Armenians 70 29500 29501 
372 Georgia Ossetes 849 30000 30001 
Some conflicts had more than one participating ethnic group. They were 
aggregated into “coalitions.” All coalitions are unique (that is, at least one element in the 
coalition is different from other constellations of ethnic groups in other coalitions). 
Original COWGREGids of the participating groups with the new “coalition” IDs: 
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Table 18.   Aggregated GREG Groups 
cowcode statename group GREGid COW_GREGid Warid Coalition ID
145 Bolivia Aymara 86 1450086 10101 
145 Bolivia Quechua 926 1450926 10101 
1452001 
625 Sudan Azande 87 6250087 18500 
625 Sudan Bari 144 6250144 18500 
625 Sudan Lotuko 640 6250640 18500 
6252002 
625 Sudan Bagirmi 98 6250098 21302 
625 Sudan Banda 129 6250129 21302 
625 Sudan Berta 173 6250173 21302 
625 Sudan Dinka 332 6250332 21302 
625 Sudan Koma 574 6250574 21302 
625 Sudan Murle 789 6250789 21302 
625 Sudan Northern Lwo 825 6250825 21302 
625 Sudan Nubians 828 6250828 21302 
625 Sudan Nuer 829 6250829 21302 
625 Sudan Teso 1082 6251082 21302 
625 Sudan For 1260 6251260 21302 
6252003 
483 Chad Arabs 999 4830999 19104 
483 Chad Arabs 1028 4831028 19104 
483 Chad Tama 1054 4831054 19104 
4832005 
552 Zimbabwe Mashona 719 5520719 22200 
552 Zimbabwe Matebele 723 5520723 22200 
552 Zimbabwe Tonga 1114 5521114 22200 
5522006 
540 Angola Lunda-Chokwe 122 5400122 23100 
540 Angola Ovimbundu-Ovambo 852 5400852 23100 
540 Angola Ovimbundu-Ovambo 853 5400853 23100 
540 Angola Lunda-Chokwe 1180 5401180 23100 
5402007 
700 Afghanistan Hazara-Berberi 434 7000434 23702 
700 Afghanistan Hazara-Deh-i-Zainat 435 7000435 23702 
700 Afghanistan Tajiks 1051 7001051 23702 
700 Afghanistan Uzbeks 1170 7001170 23702 
7002009 
450 Liberia Gere 396 4500396 24703 
450 Liberia Gola 404 4500404 24703 
450 Liberia Kpelle 583 4500583 24703 
4502010 
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cowcode statename group GREGid COW_GREGid Warid Coalition ID
450 Liberia Loma 639 4500639 24703 
450 Liberia Mandingo 689 4500689 24703 
560 South Africa Xosa 1222 5601222 25100 
560 South Africa Zulus 1248 5601248 25100 
5602011 
432 Mali Tuaregs 1136 4321136 27900 
432 Mali West Sahara Arabs 1218 4321218 27900 
4322012 
437 Cote d'Ivoire Kulango 594 4370594 32800 
437 Cote d'Ivoire Lobi 636 4370636 32800 
437 Cote d'Ivoire Mandingo 689 4370689 32800 




APPENDIX C. THE CODEBOOK FOR VARIABLES USED IN 
THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Table 19.   Coding of Statistical Variables 
Variable Explanation 
intensity Total number of recorded battle deaths divided by duration of the conflict in days 
geoeprea2 Areal concentration measured using GeoEPR geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—negative 
geoeprep2 Population concentration measured using GeoEPR geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—negative 
geoeprpracohab Proportion of cohabited area measured using GeoEPR geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—positive 
geoeprprpcohab Proportion of cohabited population measured using GeoEPR geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—positive 
gregea2 Areal concentration measured using GREG geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—negative 
gregep2 Population concentration measured using GREG geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—negative 
gregpracohab Proportion of cohabited area measured using GREG geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—positive 
gregprpcohab Proportion of cohabited population measured using GREG geospatial dataset. Expected effect on intensity—positive 
cw Cold war conflict dummy, controls for availability of external support* 
democ Dummy for democratic versus nondemocratic regimes* 
intervention Dummy of external intervention into conflict* 
lngdp 
GDP per capita, as the most common proxy for general state strength. 
Measured prior to conflict, adjusted for purchasing power and 
inflation, and logged* 
milqual Military quality (military expenditures divided by number of military personnel, lagged by one year). Proxy for state military capacity* 
mountain The percentage of mountainous territory of the country. Proxies the 
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Variable Explanation 
impact of rough terrain on conflict intensity* 
size The percent of the ethnic group’s population in host country** 
statuscode 
The political status of an ethnic group in the society. The coding that 
was used to transform the original EPR definition into numeric format 
is explained below** 
settletype Type of settlement for the ethnic group*** 
incomp Type of incompatibility between the conflicting parties**** 
*Variable from Lacina’s dataset.269  
** Variable from the EPR dataset.270 
*** Variable from the GeoEPR dataset.271 
****Variable from the PRIO dataset.272 
Table 20.   Coding of the Statuscode Variable  
Initial Status designation in EPR Value Explanation 
DISCRIMINATED 1 discriminated against 
POWERLESS 2 doesn't have rights 
SEPARATIST AUTONOMY 3 have rights but limited participation in the state 
REGIONAL AUTONOMY 4 have more rights than 3 
JUNIOR PARTNER 5 have more rights than 4 
SENIOR PARTNER 6 have more rights than 5 
                                                 
269Lacina, Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars, 285.  
270 Wimmer, Cederman and Min, Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a 
New Global Data Set, 316; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and 
Analysis, 87; Lars-Erik Cederman; Brian Min; Andreas Wimmer, Ethnic Power Relations dataset, accessed 
October 22, 2010, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796. 
271 J. Wucherpfennig, N. B. Weidmann, L. Girardin, L.-E. Cederman and A Wimmer,“Politically 
Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the GeoEPR Dataset,” Journal of Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, forthcoming; Julian Wucherpfennig, Nils B. Weidmann, Lars-Erik 
Cederman, Luc Girardin, Philippe Duhart, Gustav Brown, James Flora, Andreas Wimmer, GeoEPR 
dataset, accessed October 22, 2010, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14206. 
272 Lacina and Gleditsch, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths, 145; 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/ (accessed October 22, 2010). 
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APPENDIX D. STATISTICAL TESTS OF THE LACINA’S AND 
EPR DATA 
Table 21.   The Statistical Model that Includes Only the Lacina’s Variables  
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 53 
    F( 5, 47) = 2.08 
Model 2499.04801 5 499.809601 Prob > F = 0.0843 
Residual 11280.0943 47 240.002006 R-squared = 0.1814 
Total 13779.1423 52 264.983506 Adj R-squared = 0.0943 
    Root MSE = 15.492 
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
cw 1.238983 5.094455 0.24 0.809 -9.009738 11.4877 
democ -13.82848 5.413934 -2.55 0.014 -24.71991 -2.937047 
lngdp -1.335002 1.049895 -1.27 0.210 -3.447117 .7771137 
milqual -.0001707 .0002761 -0.62 0.539 -.000726 .0003847 
mountain .0196116 .0885944 0.22 0.826 -.1586174 .1978406 
_cons 25.80921 7.351379 3.51 0.001 11.02015 40.59828 
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Table 22.   The Statistical Test of EPR and PRIO Variables  
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 102 
        F( 4, 97) = 1.87 
Model 1711.46412 4 427.8660`29 Prob > F = 0.1222 
Residual 22214.5791 97 229.01628 R-squared = 0.0715 
Total 23926.0432 101 236.891517 Adj R-squared = 0.0332 
        Root MSE = 15.133 
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
size 2.435452 8.116947 0.30 0.765 -13.67444 18.54534
statuscode 1.837817 .9495609 1.94 0.056 -.0467985 3.722433
settletype 1.455675 1.234227 1.18 0.241 -.9939239 3.905273
incomp 3.826984 3.721995 1.03 0.306 -3.560147 11.21411
_cons -2.952264 6.094652 -0.48 0.629 -15.04846 9.143934
 
  135
Table 23.   The Statistical Test of Entire Available Set of Variables Excluding the Settlement 
Patterns Data 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 53 
    F( 9, 43) = 2.61 
Model 4863.63483 9 540.40387 Prob > F = 0.0170 
Residual 8915.50748 43 207.337383 R-squared = 0.3530 
Total 13779.1423 52 264.983506 Adj R-squared = 0.2175 
    Root MSE = 14.399 
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
statuscode 4.532419 1.42758 3.17 0.003 1.65343 7.411408 
settletype -.8967446 1.581276 -0.57 0.574 -4.085692 2.292203 
size 2.320434 10.84224 0.21 0.832 -19.54503 24.1859 
incomp -1.258838 5.874823 -0.21 0.831 -13.10655 10.58887 
cw 3.843381 4.933777 0.78 0.440 -6.106528 13.79329 
democ -15.82677 5.691714 -2.78 0.008 -27.30521 -4.348336
lngdp -1.489609 1.022637 -1.46 0.152 -3.551952 .5727347 
milqual -.0002118 .0002673 -0.79 0.432 -.0007509 .0003273 
mountain .0357173 .0851297 0.42 0.677 -.1359631 .2073977 
_cons 17.61467 11.59822 1.52 0.136 -5.775362 41.0047 
 
Table 24.   The Short Model that Includes Only Statistically Significant Variables  
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 53 
    F( 2, 50) = 9.39 
Model 3760.93784 2 1880.46892 Prob > F = 0.0003 
Residual 10018.2045 50 200.364089 R-squared = 0.2729 
Total 13779.1423 52 264.983506 Adj R-squared = 0.2439 
    Root MSE = 14.155 
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
statuscode 4.129866 1.32359 3.12 0.003 1.471356 6.788376 
democ -15.1885 4.800793 -3.16 0.003 -24.83117 -5.545821
_cons 7.900676 3.808451 2.07 0.043 .2511774 15.55018 
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